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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) because the appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue on appeal is whether Appellant Neil B. Baird, DDS ("Dr. Baird") is 
bound by a settlement agreement reached on July 7, 2009 between Plaintiff NAR, Inc. 
("NAR") and Defendant/Appellee Aubrie Vermillion ("Vermillion"), which resolved all 
claims between NAR and Vermillion (the "Settlement Agreement"), where (1) Dr. Baird 
was not a party to, did not participate in the negotiation, and did not execute the 
Settlement Agreement; (2) neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel was informed that the 
Settlement Agreement waived, or even related to, Dr. Baird's pending motions for 
attorney's fees; (3) the Court did not make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird 
understood or agreed that the Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr. 
Baird's pending motions for attorney's fees; (4) a copy of the Agreement was never 
provided to Dr. Baird or his counsel; (5) Dr. Baird only appeared at the trial on July 7, 
2009 as a fact witness; and (6) the Court made a Minute Entry finding that Dr. Baird was 
not "a party of interest" in the litigation. 
"Settlement agreements are governed by the rules applied to general contract 
actions." Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 215 P.3d 933, 939 (Utah 2009). Accordingly, 
the standard of review is for correctness. Id. at 938 ("We review a district court's 
interpretation of a contract for correctness, giving no deference to the district court.") 
1 
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STATEMENT OF PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
The issue presented for review was brought before and ruled upon by the District 
Court. (R. 1041-1043 (Addendum "3"); 1075-1077 (Addendum "4")) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dr. Baird performed dental services for Vermillion. Vermillion did not pay Dr. 
Baird for the services performed. Dr. Baird assigned the debt to NAR for collection. 
NAR filed a collection lawsuit against Vermillion seeking approximately $1,000, plus 
interest. Vermillion asserted a counterclaim against NAR. Dr. Baird was never a party to 
the lawsuit, but was deposed as a fact witness and designated to testify at trial. 
Course of Proceedings 
Though he was never a party to the litigation, Dr. Baird was forced to incur more 
than $10,000 of attorney fees to protect his individual interests from the conduct of 
Vermillion and her counsel. Dr. Baird brought three separate motions for attorney fees. 
The District Court did not rule on Dr. Baird's motions, and instead reserved the motions 
for later determination. On the day of trial, NAR and Vermillion negotiated and entered 
into a Settlement Agreement. A term of the Settlement Agreement was that each party 
was to bear their own attorney fees and costs. After Dr. Baird and his counsel were 
notified of the settlement,1 Dr. Baird requested a decision on his pending motions for 
attorney fees. The District Court found that Dr. Baird was bound by NAR and 
1
 Neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel ever received a copy of the Settlement Agreement. 
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Vermillion's Settlement Agreement, and thus denied Dr. Baird's motions for attorney 
fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Dr. Baird assigned a Vermillion's debt to NAR for collection. (R. 964-982, 
Exhibit B; Addendum "5"). 
2. NAR filed a collection action against Vermillion seeking approximately $1,000, 
plus interest (R. 1-4) The debt consisted of unpaid dental services. Id 
3. Vermillion asserted a counterclaim against NAR. (R. 344-352) 
4. Dr. Baird was not a party to the action. (R. 178-179) 
5. As a result of perceived discovery abuses, Dr. Baird necessarily incurred attorney 
fees exponentially in excess of the amount in dispute in the underlying action. For 
example, as found by the District Court, Vermillion issued an overly broad 
subpoena that requested privileged information concerning Dr. Baird's other 
patients, (R, 12-37; 38-55; 390-393) and Vermillion unreasonably refused to 
cooperate with Dr. Baird concerning the scheduling of Dr. Baird's deposition. (R. 
56-71; 207-224; 240-247; 390-393) Additionally, fees were unnecessarily 
incurred to oppose Vermillion's counsel's position that Dr. Baird was not entitled 
to have his counsel present at his deposition, (R. 484-554, Exhibit B, Aff. 
Coulter) As a result of such conduct, Dr. Baird was forced to incur unnecessary 
attorney fees. 
6. Further, Vermillion filed a Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions against 
Dr. Baird. (R. 56-71) On September 11, 2007, the Trial Court ruled that 
3 
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Vermillion's Motion was "inappropriate," and the Court made a specific finding 
that Dr. Baird was not "a party of interest" in the litigation. (R. 178-179) 
7. Contrary to the Court's findings, Vermillion continued to argue in motions filed 
with the District Court that Dr. Baird was a real "party of interest" in the litigation, 
and that Vermillion's Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions Against Dr. 
Baird was still pending. (R. 207-224) 
8. On April 21,2008, the Trial Court granted Dr. Baird5s Motion to Quash 
Vermillion's Subpoena and specifically found (1) that Dr. Baird was not a real 
party in interest, and Vermillion's claim otherwise was without merit, (2) that 
"reasonable efforts were undertaken by both Dr. Baird and his counsel to produce 
documents fairly relevant to the issues in this lawsuit," (3) that "Defendant took 
advantage of proffered documents, but never made any effort to cooperate in 
setting a more convenient date for the deposition," (4) that "despite defendant's 
statement that he (sic) was not seeking overbroad or burdensome discovery, the 
Subpoena itself belies that contention." (R. 306-313) 
9. Based on the foregoing conduct of Vermillion and her counsel directed toward Dr. 
Baird, Dr. Baird made at least three motions for attorney fees. (R. 296-304; 358-
360; 484-554) 
10. The District Court reserved ruling on Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney 
fees on multiple occasions. (R. 306-313; 321; 325-339) On January 14. 2009, 
counsel for Dr. Baird understood the District Court's instruction to be that Dr. 
Baird should submit a memorandum of points and authorities to support his 
4 
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pending motions for attorney's fees upon the conclusion of'the underlying dispute 
between NAR and Vermillion. (R. 484-554; Addendum "2", at 12:9 - 13:10) 
1 l.On July 7,2009, the day trial was scheduled to commence, a Settlement 
Agreement was reached which resolved all claims between NAR and Vermillion 
Dr. Baird was present on July 7th only as a fact witness. (R.964-982, Exhibit A, 
Aff. Dr. Baird) Dr. Baird's counsel was not present. Dr. Baird was not a party to 
the settlement negotiations and did not execute the Settlement Agreement. Id. A 
copy of the Settlement Agreement was never provided to Dr. Baird or his counsel. 
Id. 
12. On July 7,2009, NAR and Vermillion stated the terms of their settlement 
agreement on the record. (Addendum "1", Partial Trial Transcript, July 7, 2009) 
Neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel was informed that the Settlement Agreement 
waived, or even related to, Dr. Baird's claims for attorney's fees that were pending 
at the time the Settlement Agreement was agreed. Id. The District Court did not 
make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird understood or agreed that the 
Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr. Baird's three pending 
motions for attorney's fees. Id. In contrast, the District Court did ask Aubrie 
Vermillion and the representative of NAR on the record for their consents to the 
Settlement Agreement. Id. 
13. On September 30, 2009, after learning the dispute between NAR and Vermillion 
had been concluded, Dr. Baird submitted a memorandum in support of his pending 
motions for attorney's fees. (R. 484-554) 
5 
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14. On May 5, 2010 a hearing was held concerning Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's 
fees, along with various counter motions filed by Vermillion. (R. 1038) 
15. The Court denied Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's fees based upon the District 
Court's finding that Dr. Baird was in privity with NAR, and thus bound by the 
NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. (R. 1041-1043 (Addendum "3")) 
16. The Court's July 65 2010 Order, and November 19, 2010 Final Order,2 rendered 
moot, and denied, Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney fees. (R. 1041-1043 
(Addendum "3"); 1075-1077 (Addendum "4")) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Dr. Baird was not a party to this case, or the Settlement Agreement entered into by 
NAR and Vermillion. Dr. Baird's interest in the case was limited to being a witness and 
claiming attorney fees against Vermillion and her counsel. Dr. Baird is not in privity 
with NAR. As such, the Settlement Agreement is not binding upon Dr. Baird. The 
pending motions for attorney's fees filed by Dr. Baird against Vermillion and her 
counsel, which had been reserved by the Trial Court on multiple occasions, were thus 
incorrectly denied as barred by NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
L DR. BAIRD WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Unless expressly stated otherwise, settlement agreements are only enforceable 
against the parties that executed the agreement. "Settlement agreements are governed by 
2
 The "Final Order" merely clarifies that the District Court's July 6, 2010 Order was its 
final order. (R. 1075-1077 (Addendum "4")) 
6 
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the rules applied to general contract actions." Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 215 P.3d 
933,939 (Utah 2009). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that non-signatory third-parties were not bound 
by or subject to a settlement agreement that unambiguously released only the claims 
between the parties named in the agreement. Id. at 939-940. In Bodell, there were only 
two parties named in the settlement agreement. Id. The settlement agreement 
specifically named which parties were released from which claims. Id. There was a 
complete lack of language within the settlement agreement indicating that the parties 
intended to satisfy all potential tort and contract claims against persons not a party to the 
agreement. Id. 
Dr. Baird (a non-signatory third party) is not bound by or subject to NAR's and 
Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird was never a party to the lawsuit. Dr. 
Baird was not a party to the settlement negotiations and was not a party to any Settlement 
Agreement between NAR and Vermillion. Dr. Baird never signed NAR's and 
Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird was merely present at place the settlement 
was negotiated because he was designated as a fact witness to testify at the trial. Dr. 
Baird never gave his verbal approval of the Settlement Agreement when it was stated into 
the record. The District Court did not make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird 
understood or agreed that the Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr. 
Baird's three pending motions for attorney's fees. In contrast, the District Court did ask 
Aubrie Vermillion and the representative of NAR on the record for their consents to the 
Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird's counsel never gave his verbal or written approval of 
7 
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the Settlement Agreement. A copy of the Settlement Agreement was never provided to 
Dr. Baird or his counsel. Based on the foregoing, and under Bodell, Dr. Baird is not 
bound by or subject to NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. 
For further support that Dr. Baird was not a party to the Settlement Agreement, 
one only has to consider the requirements of Utah Rule Professional Conduct 4.2. Rule 
4.2(a) provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the 
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer." Utah R. 
Prof. C, 4.2(a). Both NAR's and Vermillion's counsel knew that, at all times relevant, 
Dr. Baird was represented by counsel different from NAR's counsel. Dr. Baird"s counsel 
was never made aware that Vermillion was negotiating a settlement with Dr. Baird. The 
most likely reason why Dr. Baird's counsel was not so notified, is that counsel knew that 
only NAR and Vermillion were subject to the Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird 
reasonably presumes that counsel adhered to their professional duties under Rule 4.2. 
Otherwise, the negotiations and settlement would have violated standards of 
professionalism and Dr. Baird's right to counsel, which would void the agreement as it 
applies to Dr. Baird. 
Finally, as a practical matter, it would have made absolutely no sense for Dr. Baird 
to concede his pending motions for attorney's fees (in excess of $10,000) against 
Vermillion and her counsel, when there were not any counter-claims brought against Dr. 
Baird. Dr. Baird's had no exposure at trial and risked nothing. Thus, there was a failure 
of consideration for the Settlement Agreement as it applies to Dr. Baird. 
8 
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II. DR. BAIRD WAS NOT IN PRIVITY WITH NAR, AND THUS CANNOT 
BE INDIRECTLY BOUND BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR merely because Dr. Baird was designated 
witness and deposed in the matter, nor because Dr. Baird may have benefited from an 
outcome favorable to NAR at trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly articulated the law on trial witnesses and 
privity: 
It is widely held that the sole fact that a person is a witness in an action 
does not, by itself, establish privity with any of the parties to that action. 
To establish privity, the witness also must have had some control over the 
litigation That a witness had some interest in the outcome of the case is 
immaterial if he lacked control over the trial 
Baxter v. UtahDept Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1168-69 (Utah 1985) (emphasis supplied); 
see also White Pine Ranches v. Osguthorpe, 731 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Utah 1986) ("privity 
cannot be established merely through a witness in a prior proceeding in which the witness 
was not a party or did not control a party.") In Baxter, the Supreme Court held that 
collateral estoppel could not be invoked because Baxter was not a party to a prior action 
concerning the title to certain land adjacent to his own land, even though (1) Baxter was 
an expert witness in the prior action, and (2) Baxter would have benefited from a 
favorable ruling because it would have validated title to his land. Baxter, 705 P.2d at 
1168-69. 
Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR merely because he was a designated 
witness and was deposed in preparation for trial. Furthermore, Dr. Baird was not in 
privity with NAR because Dr. Baird had absolutely no control over the litigation or the 
9 
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settlement thereof. In the Assignment Agreement between Dr. Baird and NAR (R. 964-
982, Exhibit B; Addendum "5"), quoted below, Dr. Baird granted NAR the exclusive 
right ("full power") to compromise and settle the claim. NAR and its counsel had sole 
control over the litigation—Dr. Baird had none. Further, Privity is not established by Dr. 
Baird's contractual right to receive a percentage of the amount collected by NAR. 
Similar to Baxter, the Settlement Agreement cannot be enforced against Dr. Baird under 
a theory of privity merely because Dr. Baird may have received some benefit from a 
litigation outcome favorable to NAR. It is clear that Dr. Baird was not in privity with 
NAR as it applies to enforceability of the Settlement Agreement against Dr. Baird. 
Additionally, privity cannot be established between Dr. Baird and NAR on the 
basis that they represent the "same legal right." Searle Bros v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689,691 
(Utah 1978). Dr. Baird's and NAR's legal rights are not the same. Dr. Baird had a legal 
right to receive a percentage of money from NAR only if NAR were to collect money 
from Vermillion. NAR, as an assignee of the claim, had a legal right to collect from 
Vermillion a debt owed. In the Assignment Agreement, Dr. Baird assigned all of his 
rights in the debt to NAR, and retained no right to make claims against Vermillion on the 
same debt: 
[Dr. Baird] hereby transfers, assigns and sets over to NAR, [Dr. Baird's] 
claims and demands against all debtors assigned together with all of [Dr. 
Baird 'sj rights, title and interest therein, and the demands represented 
thereby, and all rights of action accrued or to accrue. [Dr. Baird] further 
grants to NAR . . .full power to collect, compromise, reassign, or in any 
other manner enforce the collection thereof. 
10 
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(R. 964-982, Exhibit B; Addendum "5"). By contract, Dr. Baird had no legal interest in 
the action brought by NAR against Vermillion. Furthermore, Vermillion had claims 
pending against NAR at the time the settlement was reached. Vermillion had no claims 
pending against Dr. Baird. Therefore, NAR's interest in settling its exposure in the case 
drastically differed from any interest Dr. Baird has in the outcome of the case. Based on 
the foregoing, privity cannot be established based upon Dr. Baird and NAR representing 
the "same legal right." 
In sum, Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR by reason of the fact that Dr. Baird 
was a trial witness, or may have been benefited by a litigation outcome favorable to 
NAR, and it is clear that Dr. Baird and NAR do not share the "same legal right." 
CONCLUSION 
Dr. Baird does not challenge the public policy favoring enforcement of settlement 
agreements. However, the Settlement Agreement at issue cannot be enforced against Dr. 
Baird because he is not a party to that agreement and is not in legal privity with NAR. 
Even if Dr. Baird was a party to, or was in privity with NAR, the Settlement Agreement 
still cannot be enforced against Dr. Baird because the Settlement Agreement would have 
been negotiated and agreed upon in violation of Dr. Baird's right to counsel, standards of 
professionalism, and for a failure of consideration. 
For the foregoing reasons, the final order on appeal should be reversed to the 
extent it finds that Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney's fees were barred by the 
terms of the Settlement Agreement, and Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's fees should be 
remanded to the District Court for hearing and a decision. 
11 
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DATED this day of August, 2011. 
*k-
Defek A. Coulter 
Robert T. Tateoka 
Attorneys for Appellant Neil B. Baird, D.D.S. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2009, 2:30 P.M. 
-oooOooo-
[Excerpt of proceedings.] 
THE COURT: Okay. Everyone go ahead and be 
seated, please. We are back on the record with the jury 
present in the jury box. Counsel also present. 
MR. ADY: I believe we would like to approach, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Oh, sure. Come on up. 
{Discussion at bench.) 
THE COURT: We need to excuse you for one more 
very quick issue. It should help. Okay? Take them back, 
Elaine. 
(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Go ahead and be seated. 
We are on the record. Let me know where you are 
on this, counsel. Who would like to speak? 
MR. ADY: I understand that what we've got is 
plaintiff will pay the defendant $1,000. The debt will be -
or the claim for the debt will be extinguished and expunged 
from Ms. Vermillion's credit reports, all credit reporting 
agencies to which the debt has been - the claimed debt has 
been reported will be expunged forthwith. There will be a 
confidentiality provision as to the $1,000 only, that 
neither party will disclose it to any other third party. 
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They can talk about the settlement; they can't talk about 
the $1,000, 
And that there will be no ~ it will not be 
characterized as a forgiveness of debt, for tax purposes. 
There's not going to be any form sent to my client saying 
that they've been - I forget the tax number, it escapes me, 
of the IRS form. 
THE COURT: It's sort of like a 1099, isn't it? 
Or a -
MR. SCOFIELD: 1099. 
MR. ADY: Yeah, 1099. There we are. There won't 
be a 1099 sent to them. And - and we're also going to 
release Dr. Baird from any claims as well. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ADY: Is there anything else? 
THE COURT: Is that the agreement, Mr, Scofield? 
MR. SCOFIELD: Let me just clarify my 
understanding on the confidentiality of the $1,000 payment. 
It's no reference to there being a payment, not necessarily 
just the amount. And the release would be as to NAR, its 
officers, agents, Dr. Baird, his officers, agents and both 
of their attorneys. And, likewise -
THE COURT: It's meant to be - it's meant to be -
inclusive — 
MR. ADY: Aubrey and Dustin, the other way as 
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well, 
THE COURT: All claims both ways. 
MR. ADY: Yeah. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Right. And then with respect to 
clearing up the credit, I don't know that I necessarily 
agree with the "forthwith," but I would say — 
THE COURT: That one struck me. As soon as you 
reasonably can. You wonft get it done forthwith. Forthwith 
is when they put you in handcuffs and take you through that 
door. 
MR. ADY: Right. 
THE COURT: That's forthwith. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Right. Well, we111 do is as soon 
as reasonably practicable. And I think we should be able to 
get a check to them -
MR. ADY: I think the language on the credit, if I 
may just interpose, NAR does not directly control the 
database of credit reporting agencies. All they can do is 
make requests. Either they're - they're requested, but 
there aren't any requests (inaudible). The language in the 
agreement needs to reflect that that is their obligation to 
make this request. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Your Honor, the issue is not to 
force Experian -
THE COURT: But you'll make the request in the -
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in the most effective form you -
MR. ADY: Absolutely. 
MR. SCOFIELD: What NAR does, it submits a form 
called a UDF or an AUDF, Uniform Data Form, to the credit 
furnisher to the credit reporting agency. And if they send 
in - I don't know if they use - I would imagine they're 
using Metro 2 and doing the AUDFs. If you're doing the 
Metro 2 format, you simply have to indicate on there that 
there is no debt and -
MR. ADY: Right. But they don't have to 
(inaudible) occasionally that, but once -
THE COURT: You're not guaranteed what they do. 
MR. ADY: Yeah. And we're not going to guarantee 
Experian's performance. We can only guarantee that NAR will 
go through the proper channels, commercially reasonable 
channels, that it will use the same format that they 
normally use. There's no reason — NAR doesn't want this on 
their — on Ms. Vermillion's credit. They want to comply. 
But there's no reason to saddle any obligations -
THE COURT: Mr. Saxton seemed to have a concern. 
I don't know if they've resolved the point that you're -
MR. SAXTON: The funds you're referring to, 
Mr. Ady, are outdated. We don't use those any more. It's 
an electronic submission now. 
MR. ADY: (Inaudible)• 
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1 MR. SAXTON: It's an electronic submission, not 
2 necessarily that, but it is an electronic submission. And 
3 we'll electronically submit it to have it updated. 
4 MR. ADY: Okay. And if - and I guess - you know, 
5 my understanding is they can take it off. You know, if 
6 I they - and our position is that if it doesn't come off, 
7 there's not a settlement; is that right? 
8 j THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to go down that 
9 road. They can only do what they can do. If they don't 
10 submit, there's not a settlement. That would be a failure 
11 of consideration. But since they don't control the other 
12 end... 
13 MR. ADY: Well, that's - that's where the 
14 difference is. 
15 THE COURT: Then let's bring the jury in. Because 
16 they can only do what they can do. 
17 MR. SCOFIELD: Well, and then one thing -
18 MR. ADY: Well, I'm just saying, Chip - Chip, if I 
19 call you, you'll help me, right? If I call you and say, 
20 "Hey, these guys are being butts; will you - will you make a 
21 phone call for me?" 
22 MR. SAXTON: What I do know - what my experience 
23 is, Mr. Ady, I can't direct you as to your - your client 
24 directly. But my experience is that, if there is some sort 
25 of an issue like that, that it's fairly easily cleared up 
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with the credit reporting agencies. The person affected 
just needs to contact the credit reporting agencies, file a 
dispute, the dispute comes back to NAR, and they say, "Hey, 
what's going on?" And they say, "No, take it off. Take it 
off." And so then it's - it's all done. 
MR. SCOFIELD: I think what we can agree to do is 
everything that can be - can be done to notify a credit 
reporting agency that there's no debt. 
THE COURT: Well, that's what -
MR. ADY: I still won't act, then the remedy comes 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, I think, because 
they're reporting a debt that doesn't exist anymore, so -
MR. SAXTON: And -
MR. ADY: Because it's later debt. And so 
you're -
THE COURT: And you think that's going to happen. 
MR. ADY: And the reporting cycle's every 30 days. 
So you're going to submit it within the next -
MR, SAXTON: We can do it electronically, 
manually, on demand, So -
MR. ADY: Okay. 
MR. SAXTON: - if this happens, I'll call my 
office on the way back, tell them to delete it and they'll 
electronically submit it to have it deleted, 
MR. ADY: And there's going to be transparency for 
8 
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us so that we can see what you've done and submitted? 
MR. SCOFIELD: We'll send you -
MR. SAXTON: We can send - we can send a notice 
that says we've done it. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Whatever we have consented. 
MR. SAXTON: Yeah, we can. We can do that, you 
bet. 
THE COURT: So do we have an agreement now? 
MR. ADY: All right. 
THE COURT: Mr. Scofield, anything else you need 
to add? 
MR. SCOFIELD: Just when can we get them a check 
and how do you want it made out? 
MR. ADY: Just to me in trust. 
MR. SCOFIELD: You in trust for a thousand. 
And the only other point would be those are all 
the payments; otherwise, everyone bears their own attorneys 
fees, costs and expenses. 
THE COURT: Absolutely. It's got to be that. 
MR. SCOFIELD: And that's my understanding of the 
agreement, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Saxton, as president of 
NAR and (inaudible): Are you willing to abide by this 
agreement as stated, sir? 
MR. SAXTON: Yes, I am. 
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THE COURT: The plaintiff - the party is 
Ms. Vermillion, but I'd like to hear from both of you if 
you're willing to abide by this. 
MR, ADY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Vermillion, you accept it? That's 
a yes, but I - I note - I'm pretty sure no one's happy. I 
also think you've all done the right thing. And I'm sorry 
things had to get to this point, 
I'll approve the settlement. I'll look forward to 
concluding documents. 
Are you going to draft those, Mr, Scofield? 
MR. SCOFIELD: I'd be happy to, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
May I release the jury? 
MR. SCOFIELD: You may. 
MR. ADY: You may, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was 
concluded at 2:39 p.m.) 
-000O000-
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) because the appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue on appeal is whether Appellant Neil B. Baird, DDS ("Dr. Baird") is 
bound by a settlement agreement reached on July 7, 2009 between Plaintiff NAR, Inc. 
("NAR") and Defendant/Appellee Aubrie Vermillion ("Vermillion"), which resolved all 
claims between NAR and Vermillion (the "Settlement Agreement"), where (1) Dr. Baird 
was not a party to, did not participate in the negotiation, and did not execute the 
Settlement Agreement; (2) neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel was informed that the 
Settlement Agreement waived, or even related to, Dr. Baird's pending motions for 
attorney's fees; (3) the Court did not make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird 
understood or agreed that the Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr. 
Baird's pending motions for attorney's fees; (4) a copy of the Agreement was never 
provided to Dr. Baird or his counsel; (5) Dr. Baird only appeared at the trial on July 7, 
2009 as a fact witness; and (6) the Court made a Minute Entry finding that Dr. Baird was 
not "a party of interest" in the litigation. 
"Settlement agreements are governed by the rules applied to general contract 
actions." Bodell Constr. Co. v, Robbins, 215 P.3d 933, 939 (Utah 2009). Accordingly, 
the standard of review is for correctness. Id. at 938 ("We review a district court's 
interpretation of a contract for correctness, giving no deference to the district court.") 
1 
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STATEMENT OF PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
The issue presented for review was brought before and ruled upon by the District 
Court. (R. 1041-1043 (Addendum "3"); 1075-1077 (Addendum "4")) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dr. Baird performed dental services for Vermillion. Vermillion did not pay Dr. 
Baird for the services performed. Dr. Baird assigned the debt to NAR for collection, 
NAR filed a collection lawsuit against Vermillion seeking approximately $1,000, plus 
interest. Vermillion asserted a counterclaim against NAR. Dr. Baird was never a party to 
the lawsuit, but was deposed as a fact witness and designated to testify at trial. 
Course of Proceedings 
Though he was never a party to the litigation, Dr. Baird was forced to incur more 
than $10,000 of attorney fees to protect his individual interests from the conduct of 
Vermillion and her counsel. Dr. Baird brought three separate motions for attorney fees. 
The District Court did not rule on Dr. Baird's motions, and instead reserved the motions 
for later determination. On the day of trial, NAR and Vermillion negotiated and entered 
into a Settlement Agreement. A term of the Settlement Agreement was that each party 
was to bear their own attorney fees and costs. After Dr. Baird and his counsel were 
notified of the settlement,1 Dr. Baird requested a decision on his pending motions for 
attorney fees. The District Court found that Dr. Baird was bound by NAR and 
Neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel ever received a copy of the Settlement Agreement. 
i 
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Vermillion's Settlement Agreement, and thus denied Dr. Baird's motions for attorney 
fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Dr. Baird assigned a Vermillion's debt to NAR for collection. (R. 964-982, 
Exhibit B; Addendum "5"). 
2. NAR filed a collection action against Vermillion seeking approximately $1,000, 
plus interest. (R. 1-4) The debt consisted of unpaid dental services. Id. 
3. Vermillion asserted a counterclaim against NAR. (R. 344-352) 
4. Dr. Baird was not a party to the action. (R. 178-179) 
5. As a result of perceived discovery abuses, Dr. Baird necessarily incurred attorney 
fees exponentially in excess of the amount in dispute in the underlying action. For 
example, as found by the District Court, Vermillion issued an overly broad 
subpoena that requested privileged information concerning Dr. Baird's other 
patients, (R. 12-37; 38-55; 390-393) and Vermillion unreasonably refused to 
cooperate with Dr. Baird concerning the scheduling of Dr. Baird's deposition. (R. 
56-71; 207-224; 240-247; 390-393) Additionally, fees were unnecessarily 
incurred to oppose Vermillion's counsel's position that Dr. Baird was not entitled 
to have his counsel present at his deposition. (R. 484-554, Exhibit B, Aff. 
Coulter) As a result of such conduct, Dr. Baird was forced to incur unnecessary 
attorney fees. 
6. Further, Vermillion filed a Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions against 
Dr. Baird. (R. 56-71) On September 11, 2007, the Trial Court ruled that 
3 
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Vermillion's Motion was "inappropriate," and the Court made a specific finding 
that Dr. Baird was not "a party of interest" in the litigation. (R. 178-179) 
7. Contrary to the Court's findings, Vermillion continued to argue in motions filed 
with the District Court that Dr. Baird was a real "party of interest" in the litigation, 
and that Vermillion's Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions Against Dr. 
Baird was still pending. (R. 207-224) 
8. On April 21, 2008, the Trial Court granted Dr. Baird's Motion to Quash 
Vermillion's Subpoena and specifically found (1) that Dr. Baird was not a real 
party in interest, and Vermillion's claim otherwise was without merit, (2) that 
"reasonable efforts were undertaken by both Dr. Baird and his counsel to produce 
documents fairly relevant to the issues in this lawsuit," (3) that "Defendant took 
advantage of proffered documents, but never made any effort to cooperate in 
setting a more convenient date for the deposition," (4) that "despite defendant's 
statement that he (sic) was not seeking overbroad or burdensome discovery, the 
Subpoena itself belies that contention." (R. 306-313) 
9. Based on the foregoing conduct of Vermillion and her counsel directed toward Dr. 
Baird, Dr. Baird made at least three motions for attorney fees. (R. 296-304; 358-
360; 484-554) 
10. The District Court reserved ruling on Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney 
fees on multiple occasions. (R. 306-313; 321; 325-339) On January 14, 2009, 
counsel for Dr. Baird understood the District Court's instruction to be that Dr. 
Baird should submit a memorandum of points and authorities to support his 
4 
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pending motions for attorney's fees upon the conclusion of'the underlying dispute 
between NAR and Vermillion. (R. 484-554; Addendum "2", at 12:9 - 13:10) 
11. On July 7,2009, the day trial was scheduled to commence, a Settlement 
Agreement was reached which resolved all claims between NAR and Vermillion 
Dr. Baird was present on July 7th only as a fact witness. (R.964-982, Exhibit A, 
Aff. Dr. Baird) Dr. Baird's counsel was not present. Dr. Baird was not a party to 
the settlement negotiations and did not execute the Settlement Agreement. Id. A 
copy of the Settlement Agreement was never provided to Dr. Baird or his counsel. 
Id. 
12. On July 7,2009, NAR and Vermillion stated the terms of their settlement 
agreement on the record. (Addendum "1", Partial Trial Transcript, July 7, 2009) 
Neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel was informed that the Settlement Agreement 
waived, or even related to, Dr. Baird's claims for attorney's fees that were pending 
at the time the Settlement Agreement was agreed. Id. The District Court did not 
make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird understood or agreed that the 
Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr. Baird's three pending 
motions for attorney's fees. Id. In contrast, the District Court did ask Aubrie 
Vermillion and the representative of NAR on the record for their consents to the 
Settlement Agreement. Id. 
13. On September 30, 2009, after learning the dispute between NAR and Vermillion 
had been concluded, Dr. Baird submitted a memorandum in support of his pending 
motions for attorney's fees. (R. 484-554) 
5 
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14. On May 5, 2010 a hearing was held concerning Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's 
fees, along with various counter motions filed by Vermillion. (R. 1038) 
15. The Court denied Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's fees based upon the District 
Court's finding that Dr. Baird was in privity with NAR, and thus bound by the 
NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. (R. 1041-1043 (Addendum "3")) 
16. The Court's July 6, 2010 Order, and November 19, 2010 Final Order,2 rendered 
moot, and denied, Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney fees. (R. 1041-1043 
(Addendum "3"); 1075-1077 (Addendum "4")) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Dr. Baird was not a party to this case, or the Settlement Agreement entered into by 
NAR and Vermillion. Dr. Baird's interest in the case was limited to being a witness and 
claiming attorney fees against Vermillion and her counsel. Dr. Baird is not in privity 
with NAR. As such, the Settlement Agreement is not binding upon Dr. Baird. The 
pending motions for attorney's fees filed by Dr. Baird against Vermillion and her 
counsel, which had been reserved by the Trial Court on multiple occasions, were thus 
incorrectly denied as barred by NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
L DR. BAIRD WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Unless expressly stated otherwise, settlement agreements are only enforceable 
against the parties that executed the agreement. "Settlement agreements are governed by 
2
 The "Final Order" merely clarifies that the District Court's July 6,2010 Order was its 
final order. (R. 1075-1077 (Addendum "4")) 
6 
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the rules applied to general contract actions." Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 215 P.3d 
933,939 (Utah 2009). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that non-signatory third-parties were not bound 
by or subject to a settlement agreement that unambiguously released only the claims 
between the parties named in the agreement. Id. at 939-940. In Bodell, there were only 
two parties named in the settlement agreement. Id. The settlement agreement 
specifically named which parties were released from which claims. Id. There was a 
complete lack of language within the settlement agreement indicating that the parties 
intended to satisfy all potential tort and contract claims against persons not a party to the 
agreement. Id. 
Dr. Baird (a non-signatory third party) is not bound by or subject to NAR's and 
Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird was never a party to the lawsuit. Dr. 
Baird was not a party to the settlement negotiations and was not a party to any Settlement 
Agreement between NAR and Vermillion. Dr. Baird never signed NAR's and 
Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird was merely present at place the settlement 
was negotiated because he was designated as a fact witness to testify at the trial. Dr. 
Baird never gave his verbal approval of the Settlement Agreement when it was stated into 
the record. The District Court did not make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird 
understood or agreed that the Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr. 
Baird's three pending motions for attorney's fees. In contrast, the District Court did ask 
Aubrie Vermillion and the representative of NAR on the record for their consents to the 
Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird's counsel never gave his verbal or written approval of 
7 
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the Settlement Agreement. A copy of the Settlement Agreement was never provided to 
Dr. Baird or his counsel. Based on the foregoing, and under Bodell, Dr. Baird is not 
bound by or subject to NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. 
For further support that Dr. Baird was not a party to the Settlement Agreement, 
one only has to consider the requirements of Utah Rule Professional Conduct 4.2. Rule 
4.2(a) provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the 
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the law7er has the consent of the other lawyer." Utah R. 
Prof. C. 4.2(a). Both NAR's and Vermillion's counsel knew that, at all times relevant, 
Dr. Baird was represented by counsel different from NAR's counsel. Dr. Baird's counsel 
was never made aware that Vermillion was negotiating a settlement with Dr. Baird. The 
most likely reason why Dr. Baird's counsel was not so notified, is that counsel knew that 
only NAR and Vermillion were subject to the Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird 
reasonably presumes that counsel adhered to their professional duties under Rule 4.2. 
Otherwise, the negotiations and settlement would have violated standards of 
professionalism and Dr. Baird's right to counsel, which would void the agreement as it 
applies to Dr. Baird. 
Finally, as a practical matter, it would have made absolutely no sense for Dr. Baird 
to concede his pending motions for attorney's fees (in excess of $10,000) against 
Vermillion and her counsel, when there were not any counter-claims brought against Dr. 
Baird. Dr. Baird's had no exposure at trial and risked nothing. Thus, there was a failure 
of consideration for the Settlement Agreement as it applies to Dr. Baird. 
8 
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II. DR. BAIRD WAS NOT IN PRIVITY WITH NAR, AND THUS CANNOT 
BE INDIRECTLY BOUND BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR merely because Dr. Baird was designated 
witness and deposed in the matter, nor because Dr. Baird may have benefited from an 
outcome favorable to NAR at trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly articulated the law on trial witnesses and 
privity: 
It is widely held that the sole fact that a person is a witness in an action 
does not, by itself, establish privity with any of the parties to that action. 
To establish privity, the witness also must have had some control over the 
litigation.... That a witness had some interest in the outcome of the case is 
immaterial if he lacked control over the trial 
Baxter v. UtahDepL Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1168-69 (Utah 1985) (emphasis supplied); 
see also White Pine Ranches v. Osguthorpe, 731 P,2d 1076, 1077 (Utah 1986) ("privity 
cannot be established merely through a witness in a prior proceeding in which the witness 
was not a party or did not control a party.") In Baxter, the Supreme Court held that 
collateral estoppel could not be invoked because Baxter was not a party to a prior action 
concerning the title to certain land adjacent to his own land, even though (1) Baxter was 
an expert witness in the prior action, and (2) Baxter would have benefited from a 
favorable ruling because it would have validated title to his land. Baxter, 705 P.2d at 
1168-69. 
Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR merely because he was a designated 
witness and was deposed in preparation for trial. Furthermore, Dr. Baird was not in 
privity with NAR because Dr. Baird had absolutely no control over the litigation or the 
9 
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settlement thereof In the Assignment Agreement between Dr. Baird and NAR (R. 964-
982, Exhibit B; Addendum "5"), quoted below, Dr. Baird granted NAR the exclusive 
right ("full power") to compromise and settle the claim. NAR and its counsel had sole 
control over the litigation—Dr. Baird had none. Further, Privity is not established by Dr. 
Baird's contractual right to receive a percentage of the amount collected by NAR. 
Similar to Baxter, the Settlement Agreement cannot be enforced against Dr. Baird under 
a theory of privity merely because Dr, Baird may have received some benefit from a 
litigation outcome favorable to NAR. It is clear that Dr. Baird was not in privity with 
NAR as it applies to enforceability of the Settlement Agreement against Dr. Baird, 
Additionally, privity cannot be established between Dr. Baird and NAR on the 
basis that they represent the "same legal right." Searle Bros v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 
(Utah 1978). Dr. Baird's and NAR's legal rights are not the same. Dr. Baird had a legal 
right to receive a percentage of money from NAR only if NAR were to collect money 
from Vermillion. NAR, as an assignee of the claim, had a legal right to collect from 
Vermillion a debt owed. In the Assignment Agreement, Dr. Baird assigned all of his 
rights in the debt to NAR, and retained no right to make claims against Vermillion on the 
same debt: 
[Dr. Baird] hereby transfers, assigns and sets over to NAR, [Dr. Baird's] 
claims and demands against all debtors assigned together with all of [Dr. 
Baird's] rights, title and interest therein, and the demands represented 
thereby, and all rights of action accrued or to accrue, [Dr. Baird] further 
grants to NAR . . .full power to collect, compromise, reassign, or in any 
other manner enforce the collection thereof. 
10 
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(R. 964-982, Exhibit B; Addendum "5"). By contract, Dr. Baird had no legal interest in 
the action brought by NAR against Vermillion. Furthermore, Vermillion had claims 
pending against NAR at the time the settlement was reached. Vermillion had no claims 
pending against Dr. Baird. Therefore, NAR's interest in settling its exposure in the case 
drastically differed from any interest Dr. Baird has in the outcome of the case. Based on 
the foregoing, privity cannot be established based upon Dr. Baird and NAR representing 
the "same legal right." 
In sum, Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR by reason of the fact that Dr. Baird 
was a trial witness, or may have been benefited by a litigation outcome favorable to 
NAR, and it is clear that Dr. Baird and NAR do not share the "same legal right." 
CONCLUSION 
Dr. Baird does not challenge the public policy favoring enforcement of settlement 
agreements. However, the Settlement Agreement at issue cannot be enforced against Dr. 
Baird because he is not a party to that agreement and is not in legal privity with NAR. 
Even if Dr. Baird was a party to, or was in privity with NAR, the Settlement Agreement 
still cannot be enforced against Dr. Baird because the Settlement Agreement would have 
been negotiated and agreed upon in violation of Dr. Baird's right to counsel, standards of 
professionalism, and for a failure of consideration. 
For the foregoing reasons, the final order on appeal should be reversed to the 
extent it finds that Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney's fees were barred by the 
terms of the Settlement Agreement, and Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's fees should be 
remanded to the District Court for hearing and a decision. 
11 
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DATED this 1f\_ day of August, 201. 
/z^/S 
zfek A. Coulter 
^t-
vtt 
Robert T. Tateoka 
Attorneys for Appellant Neil B. Baird, D.D.S. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2009, 2:30 P.M. 
-oooOooo-
[Excerpt of proceedings,] 
THE COURT: Okay. Everyone go ahead and be 
seated, please. We are back on the record with the jury 
present in the jury box. Counsel also present. 
MR. ADY: I believe we would like to approach, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Oh, sure- Come on up. 
{Discussion at bench.) 
THE COURT: We need to excuse you for one more 
very quick issue. It should help. Okay? Take them back, 
Elaine. 
(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Go ahead and be seated. 
We are on the record. Let me know where you are 
on this, counsel. Who would like to speak? 
MR. ADY: I understand that what wefve got is 
plaintiff will pay the defendant $1,000. The debt will be -
or the claim for the debt will be extinguished and expunged 
from Ms. Vermillion's credit reports, all credit reporting 
agencies to which the debt has been - the claimed debt has 
been reported will be expunged forthwith. There will be a 
confidentiality provision as to the $1,000 only, that 
neither party will disclose it to any other third party. 
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They can talk about the settlement; they can't talk about 
the $1,000, 
And that there will be no — it will not be 
characterized as a forgiveness of debt, for tax purposes. 
There's not going to be any form sent to my client saying 
that they've been - I forget the tax number, it escapes me, 
of the IRS form. 
THE COURT: It's sort of like a 1099, isn't it? 
Or a -
MR. SCOFIELD: 1099. 
MR. ADY: Yeah, 1099. There we are. There won't 
be a 1099 sent to them* And - and we're also going to 
release Dr. Baird from any claims as well. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ADY: Is there anything else? 
THE COURT: Is that the agreement, Mr, Scofield? 
MR. SCOFIELD: Let me just clarify my 
understanding on the confidentiality of the $1,000 payment. 
It's no reference to there being a payment, not necessarily 
just the amount. And the release would be as to NAR, its 
officers, agents, Dr. Baird, his officers, agents and both 
of their attorneys. And, likewise -
THE COURT: It's meant to be - it's meant to be -
inclusive — 
MR. ADY: Aubrey and Dustin, the other way as 
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"1 
well, 
THE COURT: All claims both ways. 
MR. ADY: Yeah. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Right, And then with respect to 
clearing up the credit, I don't know that I necessarily 
agree with the "forthwith," but I would say -
THE COURT: That one struck me. As soon as you 
reasonably can. You wonft get it done forthwith. Forthwith 
is when they put you in handcuffs and take you through that 
door. 
MR. ADY: Right. 
THE COURT: That's forthwith. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Right. Well, we'll do is as soon 
as reasonably practicable. And I think we should be able to 
get a check to them -
MR. ADY: I think the language on the credit, if I 
may just interpose, NAR does not directly control the 
database of credit reporting agencies. All they can do is 
make requests. Either they're - they're requested, but 
there aren't any requests (inaudible). The language in the 
agreement needs to reflect that that is their obligation to 
make this request. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Your Honor, the issue is not to 
force Experian -
THE COURT: But you'll make the request in the -
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in the most effective form you -
MR. ADY: Absolutely. 
MR. SCOFIELD: What NAR does, it submits a form 
called a UDF or an AUDF, Uniform Data Form, to the credit 
furnisher to the credit reporting agency. And if they send 
in - I don't know if they use - I would imagine they're 
using Metro 2 and doing the AUDFs, If you're doing the 
Metro 2 format, you simply have to indicate on there that 
there is no debt and -
MR. ADY: Right. But they don't have to 
(inaudible) occasionally that, but once -
THE COURT: You're not guaranteed what they do. 
MR. ADY: Yeah. And we're not going to guarantee 
Experian's performance. We can only guarantee that NAR will 
go through the proper channels, commercially reasonable 
channels/ that it will use the same format that they 
normally use. There's no reason — NAR doesn't want this on 
their - on Ms. Vermillion1s credit. They want to comply. 
But there's no reason to saddle any obligations -
THE COURT: Mr. Saxton seemed to have a concern. 
I don't know if they've resolved the point that you're -
MR. SAXTON: The funds you're referring to/ 
Mr. Ady, are outdated. We don't use those any more. It's 
an electronic submission now. 
MR. ADY: (Inaudible)• 
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1 MR. SAXTON: It's an electronic submission, not 
2 necessarily that, but it is an electronic submission. And 
3 we'll electronically submit it to have it updated. 
4 MR. ADY: Okay. And if - and I guess - you know, 
5 my understanding is they can take it off. You know, if 
6 I they - and our position is that if it doesnft come off, 
7 there's not a settlement; is that right? 
8 J THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to go down that 
9 road. They can only do what they can do. If they don't 
10 submit, there's not a settlement. That would be a failure 
n of consideration. But since they don't control the other 
12 end... 
13 MR. ADY: Well, that's - that's where the 
14 difference is. 
15 THE COURT: Then let's bring the jury in. Because 
16 they can only do what they can do. 
17 MR. SCOFIELD: Well, and then one thing -
18 MR. ADY: Well, I'm just saying, Chip - Chip, if I 
19 call you, you'll help me, right? If I call you and say, 
20 "Hey, these guys are being butts; will you - will you make a 
21 phone call for me?" 
22 MR. SAXTON: What I do know - what my experience 
23 is, Mr. Ady, I can't direct you as to your - your client 
24 directly. But my experience is that, if there is some sort 
25 of an issue like that, that it's fairly easily cleared up 
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with the credit reporting agencies. The person affected 
just needs to contact the credit reporting agencies, file a 
dispute, the dispute comes back to NAR, and they say, "Hey, 
what's going on?" And they say, "No, take it off. Take it 
off." And so then it's - it's all done. 
MR. SCOFIELD: I think what we can agree to do is 
everything that can be - can be done to notify a credit 
reporting agency that there's no debt. 
THE COURT: Well, that's what -
MR. ADY: I still won't act, then the remedy comes 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, I think, because 
they're reporting a debt that doesn't exist anymore, so -
MR. SAXTON: And -
MR. ADY: Because it's later debt. And so 
you're -
THE COURT: And you think that's going to happen. 
MR. ADY: And the reporting cycle's every 30 days. 
So you're going to submit it within the next -
MR. SAXTON: We can do it electronically, 
manually, on demand. So -
MR. ADY: Okay. 
MR. SAXTON: - if this happens, I'll call my 
office on the way back, tell them to delete it and they'll 
electronically submit it to have it deleted. 
MR. ADY: And there's going to be transparency for 
8 
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us so that we can see what you've done and submitted? 
MR. SCOFIELD: We111 send you -
MR. SAXTON: We can send - we can send a notice 
that says we've done it. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Whatever we have consented. 
MR. SAXTON: Yeah, we can. We can do that, you 
bet* 
THE COURT: So do we have an agreement now? 
MR. ADY: All right. 
THE COURT: Mr, Scofield, anything else you need 
to add? 
MR. SCOFIELD: Just when can we get them a check 
and how do you want it made out? 
MR. ADY: Just to me in trust. 
MR. SCOFIELD: You in trust for a thousand. 
And the only other point would be those are all 
the payments; otherwise/ everyone bears their own attorneys 
fees, costs and expenses. 
THE COURT: Absolutely. It's got to be that. 
MR. SCOFIELD: And that's my understanding of the 
agreement, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Saxton, as president of 
NAR and (inaudible): Are you willing to abide by this 
agreement as stated, sir? 
MR. SAXTON: Yes, I am. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE COURT: The plaintiff - the party is 
Ms. Vermillion, but I'd like to hear from both of you if 
you're willing to abide by this. 
MR. ADY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms• Vermillion, you accept it? That's 
a yes, but I — I note — I'm pretty sure no one's happy. I 
also think you've all done the right thing. And I'm sorry 
things had to get to this point, 
I'll approve the settlement. I'll look forward to 
concluding documents. 
Are you going to draft those, Mr. Scofield? 
MR. SCOFIELD: I'd be happy to, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
May I release the jury? 
MR. SCOFIELD: You may. 
MR. ADY: You may, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was 
concluded at 2:39 p.m.) 
-000O000-
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 2010, 10:06 A.M. 
-OOOOooo-
THE COURT: I guess we're all here finally. 
. We're here on NAR versus Vermillion, 070908175. 
Please state appearances. 
MR. SCOFIELD: David Scofield appearing for the 
plaintiff, NAR, Inc. 
MR. ADY: Ronald Ady for the defendant, Aubrie 
Vermillion. 
MR. COULTER: Derek Coulter for Dr. Neil Baird. 
THE COURT: Okay. We are here on your motion, 
Mr. Ady, correct, the — 
MR. COULTER: No, sir. 
MR. ADY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: The motion to enforce or the other 
one? 
MR. COULTER: The first motion was our motion -
the first motion for the Court today is our motion for 
attorneys' fees. This will take — 
THE COURT: Well, I know that's true, but until I 
address the enforcement, I don't think I get to that. 
MR. ADY: In your minute entry for this hearing, 
sir, you indicated that you wished to address the 
enforcement issue first. The settlement — 
THE COURT: Then that makes sense to me. If I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
enforce the settlement, there's no attorneys' fee issue in 
this case. That's why I see it that way. I know you have a 
motion for fees. That's what raised all the other issues. 
So, yes, I'm addressing the enforcement, 
MR. COULTER: Okay. 
THE COURT: Although the number of things you have 
on the table scares the life out of me. Let's see if you 
can - I'm very familiar with the issues, as you know, 
9 ! Mr. Ady, but go ahead. 
i 
10 ; MR. ADY: Yes. 
11 ; As the Court noted when we were last before it, if 
12 I there hadn't been a comprehensive settlement agreement 
j 
13 I between everyone interested in this litigation, including 
14 i Dr. Baird, the Court would not have proceeded with the 
15 settlement. That was clearly the Court's understanding, 
16 j that was defendant's understanding. And, in fact, the 
17 I record before the Court discloses that there was a 
18 ; settlement, 
19 The transcript of the hearing at page — of the 
20 | July 7th, 2009 hearing, at page 4, lines 17 through 22, 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Mr. Scofield stated, quote: 
"Let me just clarify my understanding of the 
$1,000 payment. It's no reference to the vENA 
payment, not necessarily just the amount, and the 
release would be as to NAR, its officers, agents, 
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Dr. Baird, his officers, agents, and both of their 
attorneys. Likewise, the — " 
And then the Court interjected: 
"It's meant to be inclusive. It's meant to be 
inclusive. 
And then I said: 
"Aubrie and Dustin the other way as well." 
And the Court stated: 
"All claims both ways." 
And so - and then Mr. Scofield, on page 9, stated: 
"And the only other point would be those are all 
the payments. Otherwise, everyone bears their own 
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses•" 
Now, Dr. Baird was here, but he did not 
participate in the colloquy that I just stated and, on that 
basis, I believe, challenges this settlement as binding him. 
But the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that when a 
privy to a party - that they're privy to a party is bound by 
a settlement. And Dr. Baird was undoubtedly a privy and -
of NAR in this litigation. 
The documents attached to our motion disclose that 
Dr. Baird retained 50 percent of all monies collected and 
applied - well, at least 50 percent and as much as 66 and 
6.66 percent of all monies collected throughout this 
proceeding. 
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From the plaintiff's perspective, thatfs why they 
were here was to collect money from the defendant. That was 
the plaintiff's purpose in prosecuting this action. That's 
not a complicated concept. They were here to collect from 
the defendant, Aubrie Vermillion, a dental bill which she 
disputed, and Dr. Baird's interest in this action was 
exactly the same. He retained that 50 percent interest - or 
up to 66.64 percent interest, somewhere in that range, in 
the litigation. So his interest in this litigation was at 
least as large as NAR's, and perhaps he had a greater 
interest. 
So the question is: Did NAR represent Dr. Baird's 
interests in this action? And where that - it was that 50 
percent to 66.64 percent interest in the alleged debt, the 
answer must be "Yes, that's what this case was about." 
And not only — NAR not only adequately represented 
Dr. Baird, but fully represented him. 
Dr. Baird - although it's not required for a privy 
to have notice of an action, in this case, Dr. Baird had 
notice of the action. On July 20th, 2007, he was served 
with our subpoena. Right from the get-go, he knew that 
subpoena was served shortly after my client filed her answer 
in this case. And so Dr. Baird and his counsel knew that 
this action was being prosecuted from the very beginning. 
I've cited the cases in our memorandum, making 
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clear that, where a party's interests are litigated, where 
there's an identity of interest between a party and a privy, 
then the privy is bound by any settlement that results. 
In particular, I referred the Court to the - I 
think it!s the Mahur or Mahar case out of - 1953 case from 
the Utah Supreme Court* It says: 
"The terms of an agreement bind a party's privies, 
having knowledge thereof." 
And then there's a more recent case out of the 
District of Utah, Media News Group v. McCarvey, where the 
court applied Utah law but cited to a 10th Circuit decision, 
referring to Oklahoma law to hold that: 
"The McCarveys are so closely associated with the 
signatories to the contracts that they should be 
considered privies to the signatories and so bound 
by the integration clauses." 
And so I don't think there's any reasonable basis 
for disputing that Dr. Baird was a privy in this action. 
The settlement agreement stated on the record before this 
Court on July 7th, 2009 comprehended all claims that could 
be brought, including the claims for attorney fees that 
Dr. Baird now pursues. 
Dr. Baird cites to a number of cases, but as the 
Court knows, we distinguished all those in our reply 
memorandum. I don't think any of those cases are apt or on 
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point. And the other remaining argument by Dr. Baird is, 
"Well, gee, what we're pursuing here is our claim for 
attorneys' fees, and so that brings us outside of the 
settlement." 
But as we just read, we expressly, on the record — 
and Mr. Scofield was careful to make clear that this 
settlement resolved all claims for attorney fees, either 
way, on both sides, including agents and attorneys. 
So it was a comprehensive settlement, Dr. Baird 
was the privy of NAR in this action; he's bound by the 
settlement, and there's no claim for attorney fees for NAR 
to enforce in this action. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Scofield, are you taking a position on either 
side on this matter? 
MR. SCOFIELD: I take no position on the merits of 
this matter, Your Honor. If Your Honor has any questions 
about my authority at the time the settlement was entered 
into, I'd be happy to address those. But -
THE COURT: Well, now you've raised your question 
for me. Well, no, is the authority really the issue? If 
Dr. Baird was present, and had he objected - I mean, first, 
he was present. Second, and one of the frustrations, I 
think, for any trial judge when he reads an appellate 
decision is you realize the appellate court simply cannot be 
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in the trial judge's seat; itfs ]ust not the same 
experience. 
My recollection is crystal clear. When we were 
having that colloquy, the record doesn't show it, but more 
than once, I was talking directly to Dr. Baird waiting for 
him to say something, thinking, "This cannot possibly be the 
end of this because..." But it was the end of it, in my 
view, if he didn't object, because let's talk about the 
logic of it. 
I could not see the logic of NAR paying a thousand 
bucks in a case to a defendant if they're going to be 
exposed to thousands in fees. Where's the logic in that? 
We had a jury sitting to be selected. This was 
not just a little hearing with everyone chatting, we were 
ready to try the case to a jury. And I would — I think 
that, of Dr. Baird, we would have resolved it or we would 
have tried it to the jury. 
So I don't know if he had authority specifically 
in any way. I'd like to know that. 
MR. COULTER: I had - and never have had authority 
on behalf of Dr. Baird to enter into any agreements, Your 
Honor. What I would say — and I don't really even know the 
underlying nature of this particular fee dispute, but to the 
extent that there's a fee dispute arising out of the 
agreement that NAR was suing under, it's clear to me that 
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that fee dispute would have been resolved by my agreement. 
THE COURT: The only fee dispute for fees as 
sanctions for discovery undertaken by Mr. Ady against 
Dr. Baird personally, if — 
MR. COULTER: Then that — that doesn't affect what 
my agreement at the time was, because I only had authority 
to enter into an agreement with respect to -
THE COURT: Fair enough. Now, if Dr. Baird thinks 
that, somehow, by settling the case, NAR compromised him, I 
think it's res judicata issues, but he may have claims 
against them, since they were allegedly acting for him. Not 
you, them. But I don't know that either. That's between 
them. 
But this is where you come back to your challenge, 
Mr. Coulter, but it's your challenge and you've taken it on. 
Why isn't Dr. Baird precluded, as a privy or as a person 
present who didn't utter a word of protest at the jury trial 
of this matter? Because let's be clear for the record, if 
the case had gone forward to a jury trial, your fee claim 
would have been alive and well. 
However it played out, it was ancillary to the 
issue we would have tried. But there's a reason I said 
"everybody." There's a reason I said "inclusive." There's 
a reason why everybody, not both, mattered to me. There's a 
reason why I was looking at Dr. Baird, because, frankly, I 
10 
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couldn't believe our good fortune that people saw the light 
and were moving forward. And that's the case I saw. You 
weren't here. So talk to me. 
MR. COULTER: Yeah, I agree that it is ancillary 
to the - to the matters that were there. I talked to - how 
about a little bit of procedural history from Dr. Bairdfs 
perspective on this? 
I talked to Baird — Dr. Baird before the trial, 
and he asked me what he should do. I said, "Don't - don't 
speak unless you have a question posed to you." He was not 
represented by counsel. The Court was aware of that, David 
was aware of that, Mr. Ady was aware of that going in. 
THE COURT: But you were the counsel; you were 
welcome to be here. 
MR. COULTER: I'm not going to — we're talking 
about a $2,000 bill. My client has already spent over 
$12,000 in attorneys' fees to deal with this and process — 
THE COURT: That's a reason you should have been 
here. Your client had something at stake. You knew it 
could have settled. 
MR. COULTER: No. Your Honor, my client — look at 
the - look at the claims that were tried. What were the 
claims that were tried? The only claims that were tried 
were between NAR and the Vermillions. There was no claims 
against Dr. Baird. And the Court gave Mr. Ady — 
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THE COURT: There was your claim for fees, which 
was asserted in this case. This is the vehicle for your 
claim. 
MR. COULTER: That wasn't in the - that wasn't 
before the Court for that trial, 
THE COURT: You'd asked - not for the trial, no, 
but within the case. So you had to have a case to assert it 
in. 
MR. COULTER: And we - and those - those matters 
were reserved by the Court on three different times, and 
you — and the Court said, "When this case is finished, you 
bring these matters back before the Court." 
THE COURT: Did I say "finished"? Or I said 
"later." It could have happened a lot of times. I don't 
think I said "finished." 
MR. COULTER: I thought — my understanding was, 
when this matter was finished, when the underlying dispute 
between NAR and the Vermillions was concluded, to bring -
THE COURT: I don't believe I had -
MR. COULTER: - this claim. 
THE COURT: - I don't have all the volumes here, 
but I wrote — in at least one case, it was a written 
statement, a - reserved, right? 
MR. COULTER: Correct. There was three different 
times I was instructed to go ahead and address these matters 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at the end. That was my understanding. 
THE COURT; I know. But you still have to protect 
it until the end because, if they take away the case, what 
have we got left? 
MR. COULTER: We have the ancillary procedure 
sanction issues that would remain. If there's no claims 
against Dr. Baird at the trial - and there weren't any - the 
Court gave Dr. — gave Mr. Ady months to assert an amended 
complaint to assert claims against Dr. Baird for the trial. 
We had a discussion about this. He — 
THE COURT: Well, certiary claims are different 
from the attorneys1 fee claim. 
MR. COULTER: Yeah. And there's no attorneys' 
fees claims — the only attorneys" fees claims that would 
have been at issue at the trial were attorneys' fees claims 
between. NAR — 
THE COURT: I disagree. They didn't have to be at 
issue in the trial; they weren't being submitted to the 
jury. But to resolve and compromise the case resolves and 
compromises everything within the case and that, even if 
it's not true in other cases, it's certainly true in the 
case of a privy. There's no privity here. 
Do you disagree with that? 
MR. COULTER: Yeah. Absolutely. This is not 
legal privity. Again, we've got — 
13 
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THE COURT: Why not? 
MR. COULTER: We've got the whole party-
of-interest thing. Because the interest of Dr. Baird here 
and the interest of NAR are not the same. This is — okay, 
we've got all of these pending motions for sanctions against 
Mr. Ady and the Vermillions. None of those interests are 
shared by NAR. The Court was just able to highlight, these 
are ancillary issues. NAR's not going to participate. 
If there is claims that we'd get against NAR - or, 
excuse me, against Vermillions or Mr. Ady for these improper 
discovery abuses, NAR doesn't share in that. NAR only had 
an interest in a — in a collection account. Those interests 
are not the same; there is not the legal privity. 
THE COURT: But they're asserting Dr. Baird's 
interest as against Vermillion initially. 
MR. COULTER: And there's the Baxter case that is 
directly on point in that by the Supreme Court. Just 
because he may also benefit from something that NAR does 
against a defendant does not mean that they have the exact 
same privity interest. And they don't in this case. The 
Baxter case is very clear on that. 
The other thing that's very clear on this is that 
the Supreme Court - in 2009 — and it's Bodell v. Robbins, 
states very clearly: "Settlement agreements are only 
enforceable against the parties that signed it." 
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And if we don't have the privity and the Supreme 
Court says that settlement agreements are only enforceable 
against the parties, that means NAR and the Vermillions, and 
their counsel. That doesn't affect the rights of a third-
party ancillary claims. And then we've got two Supreme 
Court cases that are - that are directly addressing these 
issues. 
I don't see how in the world - if we don't have 
the exact same privity of interest between NAR -
THE COURT: No, it's not exact, I agree, I think 
where we're disagreeing, and very fundamentally, is that 
this attorneys' fees claim is for an abuse, really. 
MR. COULTER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: That's your point. 
MR. COULTER: I mean, things -
THE COURT: There's abuse within this action which 
was an action as to letting your claim for services rendered 
by Dr. Baird, rightly or wrongly - and I'm sorry, I do it 
every time, Counsel, is it Addy or Ady? 
MR. ADY: Ady. 
THE COURT: I thought so, then he said Addy and 
threw me off. 
MR. COULTER: I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: I've lost all confidence in my -
MR. COULTER: I'm sorry. 
15 
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THE COURT: When you've lived in this country 33 
years, not nearly as long in another country, I don't know 
which is right anymore. There are a lot of pronunciations 
here. And I don't like to do that. 
Mr. Ady, as common defense of those claims and 
alleging all sorts of other issues, which I certainly have 
concerns about what he was doing - in fact, I'm looking at 
an order right now where I quashed some of these earlier 
subpoenas - this was the forum to address that because it's 
all connected to the claim for dental services and then his 
came back related to collection processes, et cetera, et 
cetera* It was a morass. It's been a morass from the 
beginning. It's only gotten worse. Which is all part of 
the reason why a settlement had to be across the board. 
The payments — 
MR. COULTER: If I don't -
THE COURT: — everyone bears their own attorneys' 
fees cost. I needed to hear that. Everyone. Is everyone 
two sides? 
MR. COULTER: Everyone there was -
THE COURT: Not both. 
MR. COULTER: It was two sides. And Dr. Baird -
THE COURT: No, it wasn't. We had the doctor 
sitting there and looking at me, and I'm looking at him and 
saying to myself, "There's no way in the world this is 
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1 ending if this attorneys' fees isn't over, because that's a 
2 bigger case- '• 
3 MR. COULTER: It is a bigger case. 
4 THE COURT: It is the bigger case; I agree with 
5 you. 
6 MR. COULTER: And Dr. Baird got back to his office 
7 and he - and I asked him, "What happened?" 
8 He said, "NAR is just waiving their claims 
9 I against" — and here's another very important point. NAR was 
10 | waiving their claims against Vermillions, and NAR paid 
11 $1,000. This $1,000 didn't come from Dr. Baird, it came 
12 from NAR. And he said NAR was waiving their claims against 
13 the Vermillions and they — they settled their part of the 
14 claim. 
i 
15 ! If I had shown up to that trial when there was no 
16 j claims pending against Dr. Baird, would I have even had 
17 standing to address this? And the jury — 
18 THE COURT: Heaven's, yes. 
19 MR. COULTER: How -
20 THE COURT: You would have had standing to stand 
21 up and say, "Judge, they can't take away my rights to pursue 
22 | and ask any issues that you reserved." That's exactly what 
you could have said to me. 
24 : And in one of my orders here where I did quash 
25 someone's discovery, where I said I was concerned that it 
17 
i 
23 
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was an "improper use of this narrow collection proceeding 
for purposes outside of this action, and absent a showing of 
direct relevance, I will not permit any such discovery. I 
don't - for the foregoing reasons, I now formally grant the 
motion to quash the subpoena, deny defendants motion to 
compel," but, later, I gave you some — certain rights that 
were tailored to the action. "...while reserving the issue 
of attorneys1 fees and reserving for discussion at the 
scheduling conference of the necessity of any further 
discovery from Dr. Baird," et cetera. 
"Reserving" doesn't say till the end of the case, 
although there's plenty of circumstances where the 
attorneys' fees should come up at the close of the main 
case. Which — 
MR. COULTER: In this -
THE COURT: - would have still been fine if we 
still had the case and we were here with post-judgment 
issues. But what we had was a compromised dismissal. 
MR. COULTER: Again, it's a party that didn't 
agree to it. 
THE COURT: Well, I know that, but you had to 
protect yourself. You know, we could go round and round all 
morning, but we can't. 
I really see your frustration. I understand where 
you feel differently, but, one, I think there's a privy; 
18 
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two, he was here and he's apparently instructed not to 
speak. And I don't want to talk this way because I think 
you're a very, very fine attorney. Not just very fine. I 
know that. I've seen you in many circumstances and I know 
your reputation. Whatever you did, you did for your own 
reasons as a lawyer. But if anyone's going to protect 
Dr. Baird in this courtroom on that day, it was you. 
But he - if he had even whispered, but, 
apparently, he was not supposed to. 
MR. COULTER: No one asked him a question. 
THE COURT: I wouldn't ask him a question because 
he was here without his lawyer. But if he said, "Judge, 
wait a minute, I want to hear from my lawyer here," I can 
tell you how quickly I would have let him do it. 
MR. COULTER: Exactly. 
THE COURT: I would have had you on the phone. 
But you weren't here, it didn't happen, and now I've got a 
resolved case as to everybody — quote "everybody." 
Look, we disagree and I totally respect your right 
to take it up on appeal. If I'm wrong, I'd love better law 
on it. 
MR. COULTER: Well, I think we've got -
THE COURT: Well, you've got - you do what you 
wish. But, remember, there's more fees involved here. 
MR. COULTER: Well -
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THE COURT: I don't know if there are. There's no 
fee basis, is there, outside of the sanction? 
MR. COULTER: No. But we've got - we've got 
somebody that's spent $12,000 to deal with things like 
telling - telling Dr. Baird that he can't have an attorney 
in a deposition. These are things that the Court can do on 
its own initiative. 
THE COURT: But - and this is the American rule. 
We do things, sometimes we spend way too much money to 
vindicate a right or to stand on a principle. Sometimes we 
get them back, sometimes we don't. 
But sometimes, after two or three years of 
litigation that is a rathole, we say, "Well, heck, that's 
what happens, we all gotta learn from this." I may think 
differently how I do things, I may be more aggressive 
earlier. You did fine in protecting him. There was no 
issue there. You did a fine job with him. But that doesn't 
change the fact that, when the case was compromised as to 
everybody — and this is an ancillary matter, in my view, 
that is barred by - for privity, and the Court's absolutely, 
necessary apparent power to manage a case and not turn it 
into anything worse than it already is. 
A lot has been expended and wasted in this case, 
as far as I'm concerned. Throughout. 
I was grateful to have an attorney of 
20 
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Mr. Scofield's ability to come in and get a resolution on 
the underlying issue. But if it hadn't worked, we would 
have gone to trial that very day. We had about 24 to 28 
people sitting here waiting. Short of an objection stated, 
I accept the stipulation as stated, I have a doctor sitting 
there not objecting; that was my belief, and I will not 
reopen it at this time. 
I'm granting the motion to enforce the settlement. 
And, as I say, I thoroughly respect if you take it up, and 
I - I'll look forward to being educated* 
MR. COULTER: I appreciate it. And not to change 
the Court's mind here, but I think, we, as attorneys, when 
we start a case and we are starting a case as an advocate of 
our client's position, we have a duty not only to adhere to 
the Rules of Civil Procedure but also the rules of 
professional civility, to implement legal processes that are 
efficient, that don't waste an opposing party's time and 
waste the Court's time. 
Because we've got — we've got 15, 18 motions in 
this case on a $2,000 collection action. And on every 
single one of those instances, my - my client's individual 
rights were compromised and he had no choice but to go ahead 
and spend tens of thousands of dollars on nonsense. 
And this isn't a situation where a brand new 
lawyer doesn't understand that a deponent has a right to 
21 
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counsel. This isn't a situation where, in 2008, an attorney 
does not know that he cannot get HIPA requirement documents 
on the side. This — we're not talking about he had an 
attorney, we're talking about stuff that is completely 
unreasonable. It violates the Rules of Civil Procedure and 
it violated the rules of professional civility- And we've 
got a victim in here who has no faith in the justice system 
now because of what he's had to go through. And it's 
unfortunate. And I - I -
THE COURT: I totally agree it's unfortunate. I 
really do, Mr. Coulter. And I wish it had gone another way. 
But the justice system can't function, in my view, if the 
Court (inaudible) the stipulation in the circumstances we 
have here. And, again, with guidance, I'm happy to see a 
different outcome. 
MR.*G0tiLTER: Thank you, Your Honor, * 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
We have Mr. Scofield's pending order of dismissal. 
I don't know if it needs to be changed, based on where we 
are. I need an order from you, Mr, Ady, granting your 
motion to enforce settlement. So if you two want to get 
together on an order or do two orders. Or whatf s the 
order - the order should be done easily. 
MR. SCOFIELD: We can do that right now. I could 
email you something that is agreeable to us, if you want, 
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Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I just want to make sure it's clean 
and Mr. Coulter knows where he is on appellate side. 
MR. COULTER: Right. Dr. Ady won't be signing an 
agreement because his rights are compromised. 
THE COURT: Dr. Baird? 
MR. COULTER: And I don't know if he wants to 
appeal it or not. 
THE COURT: No. And that's fine. But, no, I'm 
not expecting him to sign off on an order• 
MR. COULTER: Dr. Baird. 
MR. SCOFIELD: I mean, I don't know if Ron has 
looked at my order lately, Your Honor, but it's pretty broad 
in the way it's drafted. So with his — 
THE COURT: He objected, but because of this 
pending matter. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Right. 
THE COURT: Why don't you two get together and see 
if you can do either a combined order or one each? 
MR. ADY: All right. 
THE COURT: And you can email it to me, 
(inaudible) for him to sign it. And we'll use email. I'll 
make sure we give you an email notification when it's done 
so you know when the time runs. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Okay. Okay. 
23 
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THE COURT: I hope to see you all on something 
else. 
MR. COULTER: Hopefully, more fun. 
MR. SCOFIELD: I'm sure you'll be seeing us all 
some point, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, in your case, yes. 
Thank you* 
MR, ADY: Thank you, sir. 
MR. COULTER: Thanks, Judge. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was 
concluded at 10:31 a.m.) 
-000O000-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C E R T I F I C A T E 
i STATE OF UTAH ] 
I 
] ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ] 
I, JERI KEARBEY, Official Court Transcriber in and for 
the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing electronically-
recorded proceedings were transcribed by me from an audio file furnished 
by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah; 
That pages 1 through 24, both inclusive, represent a 
full, true and correct transcript of the proceedings held on May 5 , 2010, 
and that said transcript contains all of the evidence, objections of counsel 
and rulings of the Court and all matters to which the same relate. 
DATED this 12th day of August 2010. 
I^EAreEV^OCT ~> 
I hereby affirm that the foregoing transcript was 
prepared under my supervision and direction. direction. ~ 
UUJ^ 
:arolyn tyickson, CSR 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1_ $1,000 4:23 17:11,11 
$12,00011:17 20:4 
$2,00011:1621:20 
070908175 3:4 
10:063:1 
10:31 24:12 
10th 7:11 
15 21:19 
17 4:20 
1821:19 
1953 7:5 
2007 6:20 
2008 22.1 
2009 4:20 7:2014:23 
20103:1 
20th 6:20 
22 4:20 
24 21:3 
28 21:3 
3316:1 
4 4:20 
'5 3:1 
50 5:22,23 6:7,13 
6.66 5.24 
66 5:23 
66.64 6:8,14 
7th 4:20 7:20 
9 5:10 
A.M 3:1 24:12 
ability 21:1 
able 14:7 
absent 18:2 
Absolutely 13:24 20:20 
abuse 15:12,16 
abuses 14:11 
accept 21:5 
account 14:12 
across 16:14 
acting 10:11 
action 6:3,6,13,19,20,24 7:18 8: 
10.1215:16,1718:2,7 21:20 
address 3:21,23 8:19 12:25 16:9 
17:17 
addressing 4:415:6 
Addy 15:19,21 
adequately 6:16 
adhere 21:14 
advocate 21:13 
ADY 3:8,8,12,14.22 4:9,10 10:3 
11:12,25 13:8 14:6,10 15:19.20.20 
16:5 22:2023:4,2024:8 
affect 10:5 15:4 
agents 4:25 5:1 8:8 
aggressive 20:15 
aaree 11:4 15:1017:4 18:20 22: 
agreeable 22:25 
agreement 4:127:7,19 9:25 10:1. 
6,723:5 
agreements 9:21 14:24 15:2 
ahead 4:9 12:25 21:22 
ailve 10:20 
alleged 6:14 
allegedly 10:11 
alleging 16:6 
already 11:16 20:22 
Although 4:6 6:18 18:12 
amended 13:8 
American 20:8 
amount 4:24 
ancillary 10:2111:4 13:5 14:815: 
5 20:19 
another 16:217:9 22:11 
answer 6:15,22 
anyone's 19:6 
apparent 20:21 
apparently 19:1,9 
appeal 19:20 23:8 
appearances 3:5 
appearing 3:6 
appellate 8:24,25 23:3 
applied 5:23 7.11 
appreciate 21:11 
apt7:25 
argument 8:1 
arising 9:24 
assert 12:7 13:8.9 
asserted 12:2 
asserting 14:14 
associated 7:13 
attached 5:21 
attorney 7:21 6:7,11 19:3 20:5,25 
22:1,4 
attorneys 5:2 8:8 21:12 
attorneys'3:19 4:1 5:13 8:3 11:17 
13:12,13,14,15 15:1216:17 17:1 
18:8,13 
Aubrle3:85:7 6:5 
authority 8:18,21 9:18,2010:6 
aware 11:11,12,12 
away 13:317:21 
B 
back 10:14 2:1216:1117:6 20: 
11 
Balrd's 6:6,1211:6 14:14 
barred 20:20 
based 22:19 
basis 5:16 7:17 20:2 
bears 5:1216:17 
beginning 6:2416:13 
behalf 9:21 
belief 21:6 
believe 5:1611:1 12:19 
benefit 14:18 
better 19:20 
between 4:13 7:210:1211:24 12: 
18 13:1615:9 
bigger 17:2.3,4 
bill 6:5 11:16 
bind 7:7 
binding 5:16 
bit 11:6 
board 16:14 
Bedell 14:23 
both 5:1,9 8:8 10:24 16:21 
bound 5:18 7:3.15 8:10 
brand 21:24 
bring 12:12,18 
brings 8:3 
broad 23:13 
brought 7:21 
bucks 9:11 
came 16:1117:11 
cannot 8:25 9:6 22:2 
careful 8:6 
case 4:2 6:15.19,23 7:5.5.9 9:11. 
15 10:9.19 11:212:2,7,7.11,22 13: 
3,19,20,22 14:16,20.21 17:2,3,4 
18:11,14,17 19:18 20:18.21.2321: 
13,13,2024:6 
cases 6:25 7:23,25 13:21 15:6 
Icertaln 18:6 
certainly 13:2116:6 
[certlary 13:11 
Icetera 16:11,12 18:10 
challenge 10:14,15 
challenges 5:16 
change 20:1821:11 
changed 22:19 
chatting 9:14 
choice 21:22 
Circuit 7:11 
circumstances 18:12 19:422:13 
cited 6:25 7:11 
cites 7:23 
Civil 21:15 22:5 
civility 21:16 22:6 
claim 8:2,11 10:19 12:1,3,2013: 
1215:12,17 16:10 17:14 
claims 5:9 7:20,21 8:7 10:10 11: 
22.23.23.24 13:6,9.11.14.14.15 14: 
9 15:5 16:5 17:8,10,12.16 
clarify 4:22 
clauses 7:16 
clean 23:2 
clear 5:17 7:1 8:6 9:3,25 10:18 14: 
21,22 
clearly 4:15 14:24 
client 6:22 11:16,19,21 
client's 21:14,21 
close 16:13 
closely 7:13 
collect 6:2.4 
collected 5:22,24 
collection 14:12 16:11 18.1 21:20 
colloquy 5:159:4 
combined 23:19 
come 10:14 17:11 18:13 21:1 
common 16:5 
compel 18:6 
complaint 13:9 
completely 22:4 
complicated 6:4 
comprehended 7:20 
comprehensive 4:12 8:9 
compromise 13:19 
compromised 10:918:1820:18 
21:2523:5 
compromises 13:20 
concept 6:4 
concerned 17:25 20:24 
concerns 16:7 
concluded 12:18 24:12 
conference 18:9 
confidence 15:24 
connected 16:10 
considered 7:15 
contracts 7:14 
correct 3:12 12:24 
cost 16:18 
costs 5:13 
couldn't 11:1 
COULTER 3:10,10,13,17 4:5 9:20 
10:5,15 11:4,15,21 12:4,9,16,20,24 
13:5,13,24 14:2,16 15:13,15,23,25 
16:16,20,22 17:3,6,19 18:15,19 19: 
10.15.22.25 20:3 21:11 22:11,16 
23:3,4,7,1124:3,9 
counsel 6:2311:11,1315:4,19 22: 
1 
country 16:1,2 
Court's 4:15 20:20 21:12,18 
courtroom 19:7 
crystal 9:3 
David 3:6 11:  
day 19:721:3 
deal 11:1720:4 
debt 6:14 
decision 7:11 8:25 
defendant 3:8 6:2.5 9:1114:19 
defendant's 4:16 18:5 
defense 16:5 
dental 6:516:10 
deny 18:5 
deponent 21:25 
deposition 20:6 
Derek 3:10 
different 12:10,24 13:1122:15 
differently 18:25 20:15 
direct 18:3 
directly 9:5 14:17 15:6 
disagree 13:17.23 19:19 
disagreeing 15:11 
disclose 5:21 
discloses 4:17 
discovery 10:314:1117:2518:3, 
10 
discussion 13:1018:8 
dismissal 18:18 22:18 
dispute 9:23,24 10:1,2 12:17 
disputed 6:6 
disputing 7:18 
distinguished 7:24 
District 7:10 
.doctor 16:23 21:5 Idocuments 5:21 22:2 
doing 16:7 
dollars 21:23 
done 22:23 23:23 
drafted 23:14 
Dustln 5:7 
duty 21:14 
each 23:19 
earlier 16:8 20:16 
easily 22:23 
educated 21:10 
efficient 21:17 
either 8:7,14 10:1223:19 
email 22:25 23:21,22.23 
end 9:7,7 13:1,3 18:11 
ending 17:1 
enforce 3:15 41 8:12 21:8 22:21 
enforceable 14:25 15:2 
enforcement 3:21.24 4:4 
enough 10:8 
enter 9:21 10:7 
entered 8:18 
entry 3:22 
et 16:11,1118:10 
|even 9:22 13:20 17:16 19:8 
everybody 10:23.24 19:18.18 20: 
19 
everyone 4:13 5:12 9:1416:17, 
18,16,20 
everything 13:20 
exact 14:19 15:9.10 
exactly 6:7 17:2219:15 
excuse 14:10 
expecting 23:10 
expended 20:23 
expenses 5:13 
experience 9:2 
exposed 9:12 
expressly 8:5 
extent 9:24 
(fact 4:16 16:7 20:18 
Fair 10:8 
fai h 22:7 
familiar 4:8 
far 20:24 
fee 4:1 9:23,24 10:1,2,19 13:12 
20:2 
feel 18:25 
fees 3:19 4:3 5:13 7:21 8:3.7,11 9: 
1210:211:17 12:1 13:14,14.15 
15:1216:1817:1 18:8,1319:24 
filed 6:22 
finally 3:3 
fine 18:16 19:3,3 20:16,17 23:9 
finished 12:11.13,15,17 
[first 3:17,18.24 8:22 
foregoing 18:4 
formally 18:4 
{fortune 11:1 
forum 16:9 
forward 10:19 11:2 21:10 
frankly 10:25 
frustration 18:24 
frustrations 8:23 
fully 6:17 
|fun 24:3 
function 22:12 
fundamentally 15:11 
further 18:9 
gave 11:25 13:8.818:6 
gee 8:2 
get-go 6:21 
give 23:23 
lot 13:4,25 14:2,5 15:5 17:6 19: 
7,22,23 20:3,3 21:19,19 22:7 
gotta 20:14 
gotten 16:13 
granting 21:8 22:20 
grateful20:25 greater 6:10 
.roup 7:10 
guess 3:3 
guidance 22:14 H 
happen 19:17 
NAR v. VERMILLION Paget Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. euben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
happened 12:14 17:7 
happens 20:14 
happy 8:19 22:14 
hear 16:1819:13 
hearing 3:22 4:19.20 9:14 24:11 
Heaven's 17:18 
heck 20:13 
highlight 14:7 
HIPA22:2 
history 11:6 
hold 712 
hope 24:1 
Hopefully 24:3 
However 10:21 Identity 7:2 
implement 21:16 
important 17:9 
'proper 14:10 18:1 
inaudible 22:13 23:22 
Inc3:7 
including 4:13 7:21 8:8 
inclusive 5:4,5 10:23 
Indicated 3:23 
Individual 21:21 
initially 14:15 
initiative 20:7 
instances 21:21 
instructed 12:25 19:1 
integration 7:16 
interest 6:6,7,8.9,11,14 7:2 14:3, 
3.4.12,15,20 15:9 
interested 4:13 
interests 6:13 7:1 14:6.12 
interjected 5:3 
involved 19:24 
Isn't 10:16 17:1 21:24 22:1 
issue 3:24 4:1 8:21 10:22 13:15. 
1818:720:1721:2 
issues 4:3.8 10:10 13:6 14:8 15:7 
16:617:2218:18 
|ob 20:17 
udge's9:1 
udfcata 10:10 
July 4:20 6:20 7:20 
Ijury 9:13,15,17 10:17,19 13:1917: 
Justice 22:7,12 _ _ _ 
K 
knowledge 7:8 
knows 7:24 23:3 
large 6:10 
last 4:11 
lately 23:13 
law 7:11,12 19:20 
lawyer 19:6,12.1321:25 
I learn 20:14 
least 5:23 6:10 12:22 
left 13:4 
legal 13:25 14:13 21:16 
letting 15:17 
life 4:7 
I light 11:1 
Likewise 5:2 
lines 4:20 
litigated 7:1 
litigation 4:13 5:20 6:9,9 20:13 
tittle 9:1411:6 
lived 16:1 
logic 9:9,10,12 
long 16:2 
.look 11:21.22 19:19 21:10 
looked 23:13 
looking 10:25 16:7,24,24 
lost 15:24 
lot 12:14 16:3 20:23 
love 19:20 
M 
made 5:17 
Mahar 7:5 
Mahur 7:5
main 18:13 
manage 20:21 
many 19:4 
matter 8:15,17 10:18 12:17 20:19 
23:16 
mattered 10:24 
matters 11:5 12:9,12,25 
McCarvey7:10 
McCarveys7:13 
mean 8:22 14:19 15:1523:12 
means 15:3 
meant 5:4,4 
Media 7:10 
memorandum 6:25 7:25 
merits 8:16 
mind 21:12 
minute 3:22 19:13 
money 6:2 20:9 
monies 5:22,24 
months 13:8 
morass 16:12,12 
morning 18:23 
motion 3:11,15,17.17,18,18 4:3 5: 
21 18:5,5 21:822:21 
motions 14:5 21:19 
moving 11:2 
much 5:23 20:9 
must 6:15 
myself 16:25 
N 
NAR 3:4.7 4:25 5:20 6:12,16 8:10, 
119:10.2510:911:24 12:18 13:16 
14:4.7,9,11.11,18 15:3,9 17:8,9,10. 
12,12 
NAR's 6:1014:8 
narrow 18:1 
nature 9:23 
nearly 16:2 
necessarily 4:24 
necessary 20:21 
necessity 18:9 
need 22:20 
needed 16:18 
needs 22:19 
Neil 3:10 
never 9:20 
new 21:24 
News 7:10 
None 14:6 
nonsense 21:23 
noted 4:11 
notice 6:19,20 
notification 23:23 
number 4:6 7:23 object 9:8 
objected 8:22 23:15 
objecting 21:6 
objection 21:4 
office 17:6 
officers 4:25 5:1 
Oklahoma 7:12 
once 9:5 
one 3:168:2312:2217:24 18:25 
19:10 21:2123:19 
only 5:11 6:16,1610:2.611:2313: 
14 14:11,24 15:2 16:13 21:14 
oooOooo 3:2 24:13 
opposing 21:17 
order 16:8 22:18,20,22,23,23 23: 
10.13.19 
orders 17:24 22:22 
other 3:15 4:3 5:7,11 8:1 13:21 
14:22 16:6 
Otherwise 5:12 
out 4:7 7:5,9 9:24 10.21 
outcome 22:15 
outside 8:318:2 20:2 
over 11:16 17:1 
own 5:1216:17 19:5 20:7 
page 4:19.20 5:10 
paid 17:10 
part 16:1317:13 
participate 5:1514:8 
particular 7:4 9:23 
parties 14:2515:3 
.party 5:18,187:214:215:5 18:19 
party's 7:1,721:17 
paying 9:10 
payment 4:23.24 
| payments 5:12 16:15 
pending 14:517:1622:18 23:16 
people 11:1 21:4 
percent 5:22.23.24 6:7,8,14,14 
perhaps 6:10 
permit 18:3 
person 10:16 
personally 10:4 
perspective 6:1 11:7 
phone 19:16 
plaintiff 3:7 
plaintiff's 6:1,3 
played 10:21 
Please 3:5 
plenty 16:12 
point 5:118:1 14:1715:1417:9 
24:5 
posed 11:10 
position 8:14,16 21:14 
possibly 9:6 
post-Judgment 18:17 
power 20:21 
precluded 10:16 
present 8:22,23 10:17 
(pretty 23:13 
principle 20:10 
privies 7:7,15 
[privity 13:22,25 14:13,20 15:1,9 
[privy 5:18,18,19 6:18 7:2,3,18 8: 
10 10:1613:2218:25 
procedural 11:6 
procedure 13:5 21:15 22:5 
proceeded 4:14 
proceeding 5:25 18:1 
process 11:17 
processes 16:11 21:16 
professional 21:16 22:6 
pronunciations 16:3 
prosecuted 6:24 
prosecuting 6:3 
protect 13:218:22 19:6 
protecting 20:16 
protest 10:17 
purpose 6:3 
purposes 18:2 
pursue 17:21 
pursues 7:22 
pursuing 8:2 q a h 17:24 18:5 
quashed 16:8 
question 6:12 8:20 11:10 19:10, 
11 
questions 8:17 
quickly 19:14 
quote 4:21 19:18 
raised 4:3 8:20 
range 6:8 
rathole 20:13 
read 8:5 
reads 8:24 
ready 9:15 
realize 8:25 
really 8:21 9:22 15:12 18:24 22:11 
reason 10:22.23,24.25 11:18 16: 
14 
reasonable 7:17 
reasons 18:419:6 
recent 7:9 
recollection 9:3 
record 4:17 7:19 8:5 9:4 10:18 
reference 4:23 
referred 7:4 
referring 7:12 
related 16:11 
release 4:25 
relevance 18:3 
remain 13:6 
remaining 8:1 
remember 19:24 
rendered 15:17 
reopen 21:7 
reply 7:24 
represent 6:12 
represented 6:16,1711:11 
reputation 19:5 
required 6:18 
requirement 22:2 
M0:10 
reserved 12:10,2317:22 
reserving 18:7.8,11 
resolution 21:1 
resolve 13:19 
resolved 8:7 9:16 10:1 19:18 
resolves 13:19 
respect 10:7 19:1921:9 
results 7:3 
retained 5:22 6:7 
rightly 15:18 
rights 15:4 17:21 18:6 21:2223:5 
Robbins 14:23 
Ron 23:12 
Ronald 3:8 
round 18:22.22 
rule 20:8 
Rules 21:15,15 22:5.6 
runs 23:24 same 6:7 9:1 14:4.13.20 15:9 
sanction 13:6 20:2 
sanctions 10:314:5 
saw 11:1,2 
saying 16:25 
Isays 7:615:2 
scares 4:7 
scheduling 18:9 
SCORELD 3:6.6 4:21 5:10 8:6,14, 
16 22:2423:12,17,25 24:4,10 
Scofleld's 21:1 22:18 
seat 9:1 
Second 8:23 
0 4:2.7 9:1015:818:24 22:14 
23:18 24:1 
seeing 24:4 
seen 19:4 
selected 9:13 
sense 3:25 
served 6:20,22 
services 15:17 16:10 
settled 11:20 17:13 
settlement 3:24 4:1,12,15,18 5: 
16,19 7:3,198:4,7.9,11,18 14:24 
15:216:14 21:822:21 
settling 10:9 
share 14:11 
shared 14:7 
Short 21:4 
shortly 6:22 
show 9:4 
showing 18:2 
shown 17:15 
side 8:1522:3 23:3 
sides 8:8 16:19.22 
sign 23:10,22 
signatories 7:14,15 
signed 14:25 
signing 23:4 
simply 8:25 
since 10:11 
single 21:21 
sir 3:13,14,23 24:8 
sitting 9:13 16:24 21:4,5 
situation 21:24 22:1 
somebody 20:4 
somehow 10:9 
someone's 17:25 
sometimes 20:9,10,11,12 
somewhere 6:8 
sorry 15:18,23,25 (sorts 16:6 
specifically 9:16 
spend 20:9 21:23 
spent 11:16 20:4 
stake 11:19 
stand 17:20 20:10 
standing 17:17,20 
start 21:13 
starting 21:13 
state 3:5 
stated 4:21 5:8,10,15 7:19 21:4,5 
statement 12:23 
states 14:24 
still 13:2 18:16,17 
stipulation 21:522:13 
stuff 22:4 
submitted 13:18 
subpoena 6:21,2218:5 
subpoenas 16:9 
suing 9:25 
pposed 19:9 
Supreme 5:17 7:614:17,23 15:1.5 NAR v. VERMILLION Page 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
| system 22:7.12 
T . 
table 4:7 
tailored 18:7 
talked 11:5.8 
tens 21:23 
terms 7:7 
Thanks 24:9 
there's 4:1 7:2,9,17 8:11 9:24 10: 
22,23.23,24 13:6,13,22 14:16 15: 
16 16:25 18:12.25 19:24 20:1 
thereof 7:8 
thinking 9:6 
thinks 10:8 
third 15:4 
thoroughly 21:9 
thousand 9:10 
thousands 9:12 21:23 
three 12:10,24 20:12 
threw 15:22 
throughout 5:24 20:24 
till 18:11 
today 3:18 
together 22:22 23:18 
totally 19:19 22:10 
transcript 4:19 
trial 8:24 9:1 10:17,1911:8 12:5,6 
13:7,9,15.18 17:15 21:3 
tried 9:17 10:22 11:22.23,23 
true 3:20 13:21.21 
try 9:15 
turn 20:21 
two 15:5 16:19,22 19:1 20:12 22: 
21.22 23:18 
U 
under 9:25 
underlying 9:2312:1721:2 
understand 18:24 21:25 
understanding 4:15,16,22 12:16 
13:1 
undertaken 10:3 
undoubtedly 5:19 
unfortunate 22:9,10 
unless 11:10 
unreasonable 22:5 
until 3:2013:3 
up 6:8 17:15,21 18:13 19:2021:9 
UTAH 3:1 5:17 7:6.10,11 
utter 10:17 
V 
vehicle 12:2 
vENA4:23 
Vermillion 3:4,9 6:5 14:15 
Vermlllions ii:2412:1814:6,10 
15:3 17:10.13 
versus 3:4 
victim 22:7 
view 9:8 20:19 22:12 
vindicate 20:10 
violated 22:6 
violates 22:5 
volumes 12:21 
W 
wait 19:13 
waiting 9:5 21:4 
waiving 17:8,10,12 
wants 23:7 
waste 21:17,18 
wasted 20:23 
way 4:2 5:7 8:89:19 16:25 19:2 
20:9 22:1123:14 
ways 5:9 
welcome 11:14 
Whatever 19:5 
Where's 9:12 
Whereupon 24:11 
whispered 19:8 
whole 14:2 
wish 19:24 22:11 
wished 3:23 
within 12:7 13:2015:16 
without 19:12 
word 10:17 
worked 21:2 
world 15:816:25 
worse 16:13 20:22 
written 12:22 
I wrongly 15:18 
wrote 12:22 
Y 
years 16:2 20:12 
yourself 18:22 
I 
NARv. VERMILLION Page 3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum 3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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RONALD ADY, PLLC (USB 3694) 
8 East Broadway, Ste. 725 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)530-3122 
(801)746-3501 fax 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Third Judicial District 
JUL - 5 2010 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
3?- JL Deputy Clerk 
4 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
N.A.R., Inc. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AUBRIE VERMILLION 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Case No. 070908175 
Judge Robert 1C. Hilder 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on May 5,2010. Defendant was represented 
by Ronald Ady, of the law firm of Ronald Ady, PLLC. Dr. Neil Baird was represented by Derek A. 
Coulter of the Law Office of Derek A. Couter, P.C 
Having considered the papers filed on this motion, and the related motions and process 
brought before this Court for its consideration regarding the motion of Dr. Neil Baird for sanctions 
against the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion and her legal counsel Ronald Ady, of Ronald Ady, PLLC, 
and the cross-motion of the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion for sanctions against Derek A. Coulter, 
of Derek A. Coulter, P.C, and having read and considered the terms of the settlement between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant, the Court finding good cause appearing, 
Atf 
ORDERS AND DECREES^ follows 
1. On July 7, 2009 the parties to this" action recited to this Court on the record a 
/A 
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settlement agreement which by its terms released the PlaintiffN.A.R., Inc, its officers, agents, Dr. 
Baird, his officers, agents or their attorneys from any and all claims that could be brought against 
them individually or collectivelybythe Defendant, her agents, or her attorneys; and which released 
the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion, her agents, and her attorney from any and all claims that could be 
brought against them individually or collectively by the Plaintiff N AR, Inc, its officers, agents, Dr. 
Baird, tejmi^v^^p^*^^^ ^f^u^A,^ ^ f ^ ^ 
2. Prior to the commencement of this case Dr. Baird had a contractual right to decide o ^ #oa^ 
whether this litigation would be commenced by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc., throughout the ?AaA*~^****& 
prosecution of this action Dr. Baird retained an at least fifty percent (50%) interest in the res of the 
claims prosecuted by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. in this case, and throughout the prosecution of this 
case Dr. Baird retained a contractual right to terminate N.A.R., Inc.'s prosecution of the Plaintiffs 
claims in this case at any time prior to its conclusion. 
3. Dr. Baird was and is a privy of the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. in its prosecution of this case 
and as a privy of the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. Dr. Baird is bound by the terms of the settlement entered 
into by the Plaintiff and Defendant at the trial of this action on July 7,2009. 
4. Dr. Neil Baird was present before the Court during the July 7,2009 trial of this case 
and the settlement discussions that occurred at that trial. At that time Dr. Baird did not object to the 
settlement of this case or the terms of the settlement. 
5. Although Dr. Baird's claim for legal fees and costs against the Defendant and counsel 
for the Defendant was outstanding at the time of the trial of this action, Dr. Baird* s legal counsel was 
not present during that trial or the settlement discussions that occurred during the trial. 
6. Upon Dr. Baird's return to his office after the July 7, 2009 settlement of this action 
he informed his legal counsel, Derek A. Coulter, that this case had been settled. 
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7. Prior to Dr. Baird's renewing on October 2, 2009 his motion for attorney fees and 
costs from the Defendant and counsel for the Defendant, legal counsel for Dr. Baird made no further 
inquiry of the Court regarding the terms upon which this case was settled, and made no objection 
to the terms of the settlement 
8. Prior to Dr. Baird's renewing on October 2,2009 his motion for attorney fees and 
costs from the Defendant and counsel for the Defendant, the monetary consideration required by the 
terms of the settlement to be paid by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. to the Defendant was paid. 
9. Dr. Baird, through his legal counsel, has only objected as a matter of law to the 
enforcement of the settlement agreement as a bar to Dr. Baird's claim for attorney fees and costs 
from the Defendant and her legal counsel, and neither Dr. Baird or his legal counsel have ever 
objected to the terais of the settlement agreement entered into in this case on July 7,2009, nor has 
Dr. Baird moved to set aside or amend that settlement agreement. 
10. The motion of Dr. Neil Baird for attorney fees as sanctions against the Defendant 
Aubrie Vermillion and her attorney Ronald Ady, and the motion by the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion 
for attorney fees as sanctions against Derek A. Coulter of the Law Firm of Derek A. Coulter, P.C., 
are each denied as being barred by the terms of the July 7,2009 settlement agreement entered into 
and proceeded upon in this case. /")
 / 
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mm sesTBic? COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Derek A. Coulter (9022) 
The Law Office of Derek A. Coulter, P.C. 
11576 South State Street, Suite 503 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Telephone: (801) 501-0321 
Facsimile: (801) 307-0318 
Attorney for Neil B. Baird, D.D.S. 
NOV 1 Q 2010 
8 A U LAKE COUNTY Qfi 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
NA.R., Inc., 
Plaintiff, 
AUBRIE VERMILLION, 
Defendant. 
FINAL ORDER 
Civil No. 070908175 
Judge Robert Hilder 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on May 5,2010. Defendant was represented 
by Ronald Ady, of the law firm of Ronald Ady, PLLC. Plaintiff was represented by David W. Scofieid 
of Peters Scofieid, P.C. Dr. Neil Baird was represented by Derek A. Coulter of the Law Office of 
Derek A. Coulter, P.C. 
The Court's Order signed on July 6, 2010 was the final Order disposing of all causes of 
action between all parties. See Exhibit A, Order on Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement. 
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WHEREFORE THE COURT ORDERS: 
1. Dr. Baird was in privity of contract with its representative, Plaintiff N M , Inc. in its 
prosecution of this collection action, and as a result, Dr. Baird is bound by the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement entered into by the Plaintiff and Defendant at the trial on July 7,2009. 
2. Dr. Baird's Motion(s) for attorney fees against the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion and 
her attorney Ronald Ady are barred by the July 7, 2009 Settlement Agreement. Defendant Aubrie 
Vermillion's Motion for attorney fees as sanctions against Derek A. Coulter of the Law Firm of 
Derek A. Coulter, P.C. is denied based on Defendant's position that all claims were resolved in the 
July 7,2009 Settlement Agreement, and therefore no "active" case is available to seek such relief. 
3. This is the FINAL ORDER in this case. 
DATED this / ? "day of November, 2010. 
Th^rta. Robert] 
Third District Court Judge 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
^w /vWt-vls**-
I certify that on the ( p ^ d a y of June, 20101 caused a true copy of the above referenced 
proposed Order to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage pre-paid and addressed to: 
David W. Scofield 
Suite 115 Parleys Corp. Center 
2455 East Parleys Way 
Salt Lake City UT 84109 
Ronald Ady.PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 725 \ 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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JUL 0 8 2010 
RONALD ADY, PLLC (USB 3694) 
8 East Broadway, Ste. 725 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)530-3122 
(801)746-3501 fax 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Bjf. 
FILED m$mm eottar 
Third Judicial District 
JUL " 5 2010 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ^p 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
N.A.R., Inc. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AUBRIE VERMILLION 
Defendant. 
- i i . . •• i i. 5 S S S S S 5 B S B 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Case No. 070908175 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
.! •• ' L , • , , '" ' ' 1 ' " „ - . 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on May 5, 2010. Defendant was represented 
by Ronald Ady, of the law firm of Ronald Ady, PLLC. Dr. Neil Baird was represented by Derek A. 
Coulter of the Law Office of Derek A. Couter, P.C. 
Having considered the papers filed on this motion, and the related motions and process 
brought before this Court for its consideration regarding the motion of Dr. Neil Baird for sanctions 
against the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion and her legal counsel Ronald Ady, of Ronald Ady, PLLC, 
and the cross-motion of the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion for sanctions against Derek A. Coulter, 
of Derek A. Coulter, P.C, and having read and considered the terms of the settlement between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant, the Court finding good cause appearing, 
X 
M*. ORDERS AND DECREES, as follows: 
^ < V / / - e*« 
1. On July 7, 2009, the parties to this action recited to this Court on the record a ; 
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settlement agreement which by its terms released the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc, its officers, agents, Dr. 
Baird, his officers, agents or their attorneys from any and all claims that could be brought against 
them individually or collectively by the Defendant, her agents, or her attorneys; and which released 
the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion, her agents, and her attorney from any and all claims that could be 
brought against them individually or collectively by the Plaintiff N AR, Inc, its officers, agents, Dr. 
2. Prior to the commencement of this case Dr. Baird had a contractual right to decide GU #oa^ 
42*4*44**4 *C-
whether this litigation would be commenced by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc., throughout the y£jS~*J*^k 
prosecution of this action Dr. Baird retained an at least fifty percent (50%) interest in the res of the 
claims prosecuted by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. in this case, and throughout the prosecution of this 
case Dr. Baird retained a contractual right to terminate N.A.R., Inc.'s prosecution of the Plaintiffs 
claims in this case at any time prior to its conclusion. 
3. Dr. Baird was and is aprivy of the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. in its prosecution of this case 
and as a privy of the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. Dr. Baird is bound by the terms of the settlement entered 
into by the Plaintiff and Defendant at the trial of this action on July 7, 2009. 
4. Dr. Neil Baird was present before the Court during the July 7,2009 trial of this case 
and the settlement discussions that occurred at that trial. At that time Dr. Baird did not object to the 
settlement of this case or the terms of the settlement. 
5. Although Dr. Baird's claim for legal fees and costs against the Defendant and counsel 
for the Defendant was outstanding at the time of the trial of this action, Dr. Baird1 s legal counsel was 
not present during that trial or the settlement discussions that occurred during the trial. 
6. Upon Dr. Baird's return to his office after the July 7, 2009 settlement of this action 
he informed his legal counsel, Derek A. Coulter, that this case had been settled. 
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7. Prior to Dr. Baird*s renewing on October 2, 2009 his motion for attorney fees and 
costs from the Defendant and counsel for the Defendant, legal counsel for Dr. Baird made no further 
inquiry of the Court regarding the terms upon which this case was settled, and made no objection 
to the terms of the settlement. 
8. Prior to Dr. Baird's renewing on October 2,2009 his motion for attorney fees and 
costs from the Defendant and counsel for the Defendant, the monetary consideration required by the 
terms of the settlement to be paid by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. to the Defendant was paid. 
9. Dr. Baird, through his legal counsel, has only objected as a matter of law to the 
enforcement of the settlement agreement as a bar to Dr. Baird's claim for attorney fees and costs 
from the Defendant and her legal counsel, and neither Dr. Baird or his legal counsel have ever 
objected to the terms of the settlement agreement entered into in this case on July 7, 2009, nor has 
Dr. Baird moved to set aside or amend that settlement agreement. 
10. The motion of Dr. Neil Baird for attorney fees as sanctions against the Defendant 
Aubrie Vermillion and her attorney Ronald Ady, and the motion by the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion 
for attorney fees as sanctions against Derek A. Coulter of the Law Firm of Derek A. Coulter, P.C., 
are each denied as being barred by the terms of the July 7,2009 settlement agreement entered into 
and proceeded upon in this case. /"] . 
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NORTH AMERICAN RECOVERY 
10 W O T BROADWAY, SUITE 610 • SALT L A X B O T Y , UTAH 8410! TtLEWONE: (801) 364-0777 • TOU FREE: M0O-364-S445 • FAX: (801) 1*4-0784 
ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT 
This Agreement dated & £ C / 3 zcob , between NAR., Inc. (North 
American Recovery), hereafter referred to as Agency, and 
^i HesI «4 &>AtYd ft.D.-s. hereafter referred to as Client. NAR 
and Client are sometimes referred to as the "Parties" or a "Party" as the context may require. 
NAR is in the business of collecting past due accounts, and desires to assist Client in collecting 
past due accounts; and Gient desires that NAR assist Client in collecting past due accounts. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows: 
1. Client agrees to periodically assign, at its sole discretion, accounts to NAR for the purpose 
of collection. Accordingly, Client hereby transfers, assigns and sets over to NAR, Client's 
claims and demands against all debtors assigned together with all of Client's rights, tide and 
interest therein, and the demands represented thereby, and all rights of action accrued or to 
accrue. Client further grants to NAR, subject to the limitations contained herein, full power to 
collect, compromise, reassign, or in any other manner enforce the collection thereof. 
2. Assignments shall be made by forwarding collection accounts to NAR. Each time NAR 
receives accounts from Client, NAR will send Client an Acknowledgment Report Appearance of 
an account on the Acknowledgment Report or appearance of the account on a Statement or 
Status Report shall evidence that the account has been validly assigned ("Assigned Account") 
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement 
3. Client represents and warrants that each Assigned Account represents a legal and lawful 
debt which is in fact due and owing to Client Client further represents and warrants that, 
with respect to each Assigned Account, all amounts which Client has sought to recover on any 
such account and all amounts which Client represents to NAR are due and owing at the time 
the account is assigned to NAR, are in fact legally and lawfully owed to Client pursuant to the 
agreement between Client and the person(s) owing the debt, and/or pursuant to applicable 
law. 
4. NAR will indemnify and hold harmless Client from and against any and all claims, 
counterclaims, liabilities or demands arising from errors, omissions, or any unlawful acts by 
NAR ("NAR Caused Claims"). NAR further agrees to defend Client against any and all NAR 
Caused Claims. NAR shall be entitled to select counsel of its own choosing to defend Client 
against any and all NAR Caused Claims. Notwithstanding NAR's right to select counsel under 
this paragraph, Client shall have the right to reject the counsel chosen by NAR, and to retain 
counsel of Client's choosing to defend Gient against any NAR Caused Claims. However, in the 
event Client, for any reason, rejects the counsel selected by NAR, and/or in the event Client 
selects counsel other than the counsel chosen by NAR, to defend Client against any NAR 
Caused Claims, NAR will be relieved of any, and will have no further obligation to indemnify, 
hold harmless or defend Client from and against any and ail NAR Caused Claims. 
5. Client will indemnify and hold harmless NAR and its owners, members, shareholders, 
officers, directors, employees, attorneys or other agents (collectively referred to as "NAR 
Parties") from and against any and all daims, liabilities or demands arising from errors, 
omissions, or any unlawful acts by Client and/or Client's employees, Independent contractors 
or agents (the "Client Parties"), or arising from the falsity or breach of 
i 
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any of Clients representations or warranties. In the event any person(s) from whom NAR 
seeks to collect on an Assigned Account asserts any claims, counterclaims, liabilities or 
demands against NAR or the NAR Parties based on the conduct of Client and/or the Client 
Parties f Client Caused Claims"), Client agrees to indemnify and hold NAR and the NAR Parties 
harmless from, and agrees to defend NAR and the NAR Parties against, any and all such Client 
Caused Claims. NAR and the NAR Parties shall be entitled to select counsel of their own 
choosing to defend against any such Client Caused Claims, and Client agrees to pay the costs, 
fees and expenses Incurred by NAR and/or the NAR Parties in connection with defending 
against any such Claim, 
6. Client authorizes NAR to endorse for deposit, and collect such negotiable instruments as 
NAR may receive that are made payable to Client In the event Client receives payment from a 
debtor on an Assigned Account, Client shall, within 48 hours of the receipt of any such 
payment, notify NAR of all such payments in order to comply with the Fair Debt Collections 
Practices Act or other applicable law. 
7. NAR will provide Client with a monthly Status Report on or about the 15th of each calendar 
month. This report will list all active accounts, the current balance, and the most recent 
collection notes made while attempting to collect the account All monies due Client from NAR 
will be paid to Client by the 15th of each month following the month collected. In the event 
NAR makes a payment to Client based upon a check received from, or on behalf of, a debtor, 
and in the event the check that resulted in the payment from NAR to Client is returned unpaid 
to NAR, Client agrees to reimburse NAR the amount of money received by Client and which is 
derived from or attributable to any such returned check. 
8. NAR shall use its best efforts to attempt to collect, without legal action, each Assigned 
Account In the event NAR's efforts to collect an Assigned Account without legal action are 
not successful, and if NAR determines legal action is required to collect an Assigned Account, 
NAR may commence legal action to collect such an Assigned Account. Accordingly, before 
commencing any legal action to collect an Assigned Account, NAR shall provide Client with 
notification of NAR's decision to commence legal action. Upon receipt of such notification 
Client shall promptly notify NAR if Client does not desire to commence legal action. In the 
event Client does not promptly notif/ NAR after receipt of notice from NAR that NAR intends 
to commence legal action, Client shall be deemed to have authorized NAR to commence legal 
action, and NAR may then commence such legal action as NAR deems appropriate. In the 
event Client notifies NAR that Client does not want NAR to commence legal action, NAR will 
not commence legal action but NAR may, and NAR's discretion, continue other efforts to 
collect the Assigned Account. 
9. NAR shall not enter into any agreement for the reduction, settlement or compromise of an 
Assigned Account without prior approval from Client 
10. Client will not be billed for attorneys fees, court costs, process service fees, commissions 
or any other amounts unless an Assigned Account is withdrawn, canceled or settled by Client 
after it has been validly assigned. In the event Client withdraws an Assigned Account at any 
time, Client will reimburse NAR for all attorneys fees, court costs, process service fees and 
other costs and expenses incurred by NAR in connection with attempting to collect on the 
withdrawn account. Client will also pay NAR a commission at the applicable commission rate 
set forth in 
2 
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I • v the Commission Schedule below. Client shall be obligated to pay NAR said commission 
regardless of whether NAR or Client has collected or otherwise received any money or 
payment from the debtor in connection with the withdrawn account; and Client shall pay to 
NAR all monies due under this paragraph within thirty (30) days after notifying NAR that an 
account is being withdrawn by Client. 
11. All payments received by NAR and/or Client will be applied in the following order: court 
costs, service of process fees and other costs and expenses associated with commencing and 
pursuing legal actionr attorneys fees, damages, interest, and principal balance. NAR shall be 
entitled to retain and/or receive all attorneys fees, court costs, service of process fees and 
other costs and expenses associated with commencing and pursuing legal action, interest, 
and/or damages collected by NAR and/or Client while an account is assigned to NAR. 
12. Either Party may terminate this Agreement by providing sixty (60) days advance written 
notice to the other Party, Upon termination of the Agreement, Client shall have the option to 
(a) leave all Assigned Accounts with NAR, which NAR shall continue to attempt to collect under 
the terms of ttiis Agreement, or (b) withdraw all Assigned Accounts and pay NAR the 
commissions on such withdrawn accounts at the corresponding commission rate at the time of 
such termination, together with all costs, expenses and attorneys fees incurred in connection 
with the withdrawn accounts. 
13. NAR shall have the absolute right to reject or otherwise refuse to accept the assignment 
/...> of any account and/or cancel back to Client any Assigned Account In the event NAR cancels 
V :' an account back to Client, NAR shall provide written notice to Client that an Assigned Account 
is being canceled. The cancellation of any Assigned Account by NAR to Client, regardless of 
whether such reassignment is done voluntarily by NAR or at the request of Client, shall not 
relieve either NAR or Client of any other obligations they may have under this Agreement, 
including without limitation, the obligations relating to indemnification and duty to defend. In 
the event any Assigned Account is canceled back to Client for any reason, NAR shall be 
entitled to retain all monies relating to said account which NAR may have collected or may 
have been paid under this Agreement at time of the cancellation. 
14. In the event of a dispute over or relating to the terms of this Agreement or any Parly's 
performance under this Agreement, the prevailing party in any proceeding brought in 
connection with the dispute shall be entitled to recover from the other party its costs, 
including reasonable attorneys fees, whether incurred in litigation or otherwise. 
15. The Parties agree and acknowledge that this Agreement constitutes the entire agreement 
between the Parties, and that this Agreement supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations, 
proposed agreements, agreements or representations, whether written or oral, between the 
Parties. This agreement also covers every Assigned Account regardless of when the account 
was assigned. The Parties agree that their relationship is contractual only, and that nothing in 
this Agreement shall be interpreted or construed to create a fidudary relationship between the 
Parties. The Parties expressly acknowledge and agree that NAR is not, and shall not be 
deemed to be, acting as a fiduciary for and on behalf of Client. : 
16. Any written notices to Client under this Agreement shall be provided to Client at the 
address and facsimile number set forth below. Any written notices to NAR under this 
Agreement shall be provided to NAR at the address and facsimile number listed below. 
3 
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COMMISSION RATE SCHEDULE 
A. DEFINITIONS 
i. Assigned Amount; the original amount assigned to NAR for collection as listed on the 
Acknowledgment Report, 
ii. Regular Account: any Assigned Account with respect to which legal action has not 
been commenced, and which has not been forwarded to an out of state agency for 
collection, 
iii. Other Account: any Assigned Account (a) with respect to which legal action has been 
initiated, (b) which has been forwarded by NAR to an out of state agency for collection, 
or (c) which is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding involving a debtor. 
B . coMnre?iQN RATES 
i. Regular Accounts: 33.34% of all monies collected and applied to the Assigned Amount 
ii. Other Accounts: 50.00% of all monies collected and applied to the Assigned 
Amount 
* Ne/'( 6. &d.{rd S-D.s. 
Company Name (Client) 
M 5 ? ) it?- 10&G6 5 . 
Address 
v Sfl-H-Ctt/ i UT ?fo>7£-
* City State Zip 
v 75rtt'l/a.£es PiVw.wfua.1 fW>rdM(x+or 
Contact name and dtle 
V Phone #: Sot - &nb - «? 7«?£T 
v Fax #: &>l- 6^-^lX. 
yt%u yUteZuJ 
v
 Authorized Client Signature 
N.A.R., Inc. 
Attn: David J. Saxton 
10 West Broadway, Suite 610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Facsimile No. (801) 364-0784 
Tdtit hfft££$ &***&& OxrcLha.ii>r 
^ Please print name and title here Signature for N.A.R., Inc. 
PROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTION SERVICES • WWW.NORTH-AWERJCAN-RECOVERY.COM 
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215 P.3d 933,636 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2009 UT 52 
(Cite as: 215 P.3d 933) 
Page 1 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Mark H. ROBB1NS; Cherokee & Walker Invest-
ment Company, LLC; Cherokee & Walker, LLC; 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Successor to Bank 
One, N.A.; and Does I through 50, Defendants and 
Appellees. 
No. 20070951. 
Aug. 4,2009. 
Background: Secondary lender, which had entered 
into settlement agreement with primary lender after 
primary lender defaulted on repayment obligation 
to secondary lender, brought action against borrow-
er and bank for fraud, civil conspiracy, negligent 
misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. The Dis-
trict Court, Third District, Salt Lake, Boh ling, J., 
denied borrower's and bank's motion for summary 
judgment, but, after case was reassigned, the Dis-
trict Court, John Paul Kennedy, J., granted renewed 
summary judgment motion, and secondary lender 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Dun-ant, Associate 
C.J., held that: 
(1) settlement agreement was not an accord and sat-
isfaction which released borrower and bank from 
secondary lender's claims; 
(2) issue of whether trial court erred in striking ex-
pert report was ripe for appeal; and 
(3) expert report, which contained three new dam-
ages theories not disclosed during discovery, was 
inadmissible. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
West Headnotes 
111 Appeal and Error 30 C=>842(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(8) k. Review where evid-
ence consists of documents. Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court reviews a district court's 
interpretation of a contract for correctness, giving 
no deference to the district court. 
|2| Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVi(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Arc of Law or of Fact 
30k842(8) k. Review where evid-
ence consists of documents. Most Cited Cases 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness. 
|3 | Appeal and Error 30 €=>934(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XV1(G) Presumptions 
30k934 Judgment 
30k934(l) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Supreme Court reviews a district court's de-
cision to grant summary judgment for correctness, 
granting no deference to the district court's conclu-
sions, and views the facts and all reasonable infer-
ences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. 
|4| Appeal and Error 30 €=>96I 
30 Appeal and Error 
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30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k961 k. Depositions, affidavits, or dis-
covery. Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court reviews discovery sanc-
tions under an abuse of discretion standard. 
|5 | Accord and Satisfaction 8 €=>11(2) 
8 Accord and Satisfaction 
8k6 Part Payment 
8k 11 Conditioned on Acceptance as Payment 
in Full 
8k 11(2) k. Remittances on condition. 
Most Cited Cases 
Compromise and Settlement 89 <C=>11 
89 Compromise and Settlement 
891 In General 
89k 10 Construction of Agreement 
89kl 1 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Settlement agreement between secondary 
lender and primary lender, which then lent funds to 
borrower, was not an accord and satisfaction which 
released borrower and bank from secondary lender's 
claims after borrower defaulted on loan from 
primary lender, which then defaulted on loan from 
secondary lender, but rather was a settlement agree-
ment which only released claims between second-
ary lender and primary lender, despite use of term 
"satisfied" in agreement,, which incorporated the of-
fer of a payment by primary lender and the accept-
ance by secondary lender in satisfaction of an ob-
ligation; agreement's plain language limited the ef-
fect of the payment to the settlement of the claims 
between primary lender and secondary lender and 
did not contemplate claims as to third parties, and 
impact of the term "satisfied" was limited to 
primary lender's obligations in connection with loans. 
|6 | Compromise and Settlement 89 <Q^>2 
89 Compromise and Settlement 
891 In General 
89k 1 Nature and Requisites 
89k2 k. in general. Most Cited Cases 
Settlement agreements are governed by the 
rules applied to general contract actions. 
|7 | Compromise and Settlement 89 € = ? ! 1 
89 Compromise and Settlement 
891 In General 
89k 10 Construction of Agreement 
89k 11 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Contracts 95 €=>147(2) 
95 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(A) General Rules of Construction 
95k 147 Intention of Parties 
95kl47(2) k. Language of contract. 
Most Cited Cases 
When interpreting a contract or a settlement 
agreement, the court determines the intent of the 
contracting parties by first looking to the writing 
alone. 
|8 | Contracts 95 €>==>147(2) 
95 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(A) General Rules of Construction 
95k 147 Intention of Parties 
95kl47(2) k. Language of contract. 
Most Cited Cases 
If the writing is unambiguous, the court de-
termines the intent of the parties exclusively from 
the plain meaning of the contractual language. 
|9] Evidence 157 €=>448 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(D) Construction or Application of 
Language of Written Instrument 
I57k448 k. Grounds for admission of ex-
trinsic evidence. Most Cited Cases 
Only where there is ambiguity in the terms of 
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the contract may the court ascertain the parties' in-
tent from extrinsic evidence. 
1101 Contracts 95 €=^143(2) 
95 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(A) General Rules of Construction 
95k 143 Application to Contracts in Gen-
eral 
95k 143(2) k. Existence of ambiguity. 
Most Cited Cases 
A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if 
it is capable of more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion because of uncertain meanings of terms, miss-
ing terms, or other facial deficiencies. 
1111 Accord and Satisfaction 8 <£^ =>1 
8 Accord and Satisfaction 
8k I k. Nature and requisites in general. Most 
Cited Cases 
Accord and satisfaction is a common law 
concept. 
|12| Accord and Satisfaction 8 € = > ! 
8 Accord and Satisfaction 
8k 1 k. Nature and requisites in general. Most 
Cited Cases 
Accord and satisfaction denotes the intention of 
the contracting parties to agree that a different per-
formance, to be made in substitution of the per-
formance originally agreed upon, will discharge the 
obligation created under the original agreement. 
113] Accord and Satisfaction 8 < € ^ 1 
8 Accord and Satisfaction 
8k 1 k. Nature and requisites in general. Most 
Cited Cases 
An accord and satisfaction may discharge an 
obligation arising out of a contract, quasi-contract, 
or tort. 
114| Accord and Satisfaction 8 <C=>23 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
Page 3 
8 Accord and Satisfaction 
8k23 k. Operation and effect of satisfaction. 
Most Cited Cases 
When a claim is discharged through an accord 
and satisfaction, the claim is considered fully satis-
fied; the claimant no longer has the legal right to 
seek recovery from anyone on that claim. 
|15| Accord and Satisfaction 8 € = > ! 
8 Accord and Satisfaction 
8k 1 k. Nature and requisites in general. Most 
Cited Cases 
Before determining that an agreement consti-
tutes an accord and satisfaction, the court must find 
the following three elements in the contract: (1) an 
unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over the 
amount due, (2) a payment offered as full settle-
ment of the entire dispute, and (3) an acceptance of 
the payment as full settlement of the dispute. 
[16| Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 8 5 6 ( 1 ) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XV1 Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision 
of Lower Court 
30k856 Grounds for Sustaining De-
cision Not Considered 
30k856(l) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Supreme Court, which reversed grant of sum-
mary judgment to borrower and bank on grounds 
that settlement agreement between lenders was not 
an accord and satisfaction which released lender's 
claims against borrower and bank, would decline to 
affirm summary judgment on any of seven other 
theories presented to but not reached by the district 
court, as doing so would serve judicial economy; 
district court was already familiar with the alternat-
ive theories as they had been fully briefed and ar-
gued to that court, and thus was in a better position 
than the Supreme Court to rule on the alternative 
theories. 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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|17| Appeal and Error 30 €=>852 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision 
of Lower Court 
30k852 k. Scope and theory of case. 
Most Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 €=>856(t) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision 
of Lower Court 
30k856 Grounds for Sustaining De-
cision Not Considered 
30k856(l) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
To serve judicial economy, the Supreme Court 
may affirm a district court's decision whenever the 
decision appealed from is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record. 
|18| Appeal and Error 30 C=>18 
30 Appeal and Error 
3011 Nature and Grounds of Appellate Jurisdic-
tion 
30kl8 k. Grounds and extent in general. 
Most Cited Cases 
A dispute is ripe for appeal when a conflict 
over the application of a legal provision has 
sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal 
rights and obligations between the parties thereto. 
|19| Appeal and Error 30 €=> 18 
30 Appeal and Error 
3011 Nature and Grounds of Appellate Jurisdic-
tion 
30k 18 k. Grounds and extent in general. 
Most Cited Cases 
An issue is not ripe for appeal if there exists no 
more than a difference of opinion regarding the hy-
pothetical application of a provision to a situation 
in which the parties might, at some future time, find 
themselves. 
|20| Appeal and Error 30 €=> 169 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court 
30k 169 k. Necessity of presentation in 
general. Most Cited Cases 
If an issue was raised, argued, and resolved by 
the trial court prior to the entry of a final judgment, 
then that issue is ripe for appeal, and the failure to 
raise it on appeal results in a waiver of the right to 
raise it at a later time. 
[211 Appeal and Error 30 C=>242(4) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings 
Thereon 
30k242 Necessity of Ruling on Objection 
or Motion 
30k242(4) k. Rulings on evidence in 
general. Most Cited Cases 
Issue of whether trial court erred in striking ex-
pert report was ripe for appeal, although it was pos-
sible, in light of Supreme Court's reversal of sum-
mary judgment, that case could be later decided or 
settled on remand on issues unrelated to the inform-
ation in the report, where issue had been squarely 
presented to the district court, the court had ruled 
on the issue, the issue was ripe when the court ruled 
on it, and the court had issued a final judgment. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37(0. 
|22) Pretrial Procedure 307A €==>45 
3 07A Pretrial Procedure 
307AII Depositions and Discovery 
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307A 11(A) Discovery in General 
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions 
307Ak45 k. Facts taken as established 
or denial precluded; preclusion of evidence or wit-
ness. Most Cited Cases 
Expert report which contained three new dam-
ages theories not disclosed during discovery was in-
admissible in secondary lender's action against bor-
rower and bank for unjust enrichment, fraud, and 
other tort claims; secondary lender disclosed during 
initial discovery period that its damages "constitute 
the ftmds advanced, together with interest at the 
legal rate, less the payment received" from primary 
lender and clarified in response to request for ad-
mission that he sought interest at the legal rate as 
provided by statute, report included three new dam-
ages theories, including the benefit of the bargain 
rule, the modified benefit of the bargain rule, and 
the comparable rate of return theory, secondary 
lender's citation to statute was insufficient to con-
stitute disclosure of the "computation of any cat-
egory of damages claimed by the disclosing party," 
and borrower and bank were prejudiced by the late 
disclosure due to their inability to discover asserted 
essential facts such at secondary lender's loan his-
tory and ability to lend money to others in lieu of 
loan which ultimately went to borrower. West's 
U.C.A. §§ 15-1-1, 15-1-4; Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 
26, 37(0. 
(231 Pretrial Procedure 307A <&=?44.1 
307A Pretrial Procedure 
307A1I Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(A) Discovery in General 
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions 
307Ak44.1 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
When a party fails to make timely discovery 
disclosure, the district court is required to impose 
discovery sanctions on that party unless the failure 
to disclose is harmless or the party shows good 
cause for the failure to disclose. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rules 26,37(0. 
|24| Pretrial Procedure 307A ©=>44.1 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
Page 5 
307A Pretrial Procedure 
307A1I Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(A) Discovery in General 
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions 
307Ak44.1 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
The district court has broad discretion regard-
ing the imposition of discovery sanctions. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 37. 
|2S| Appeal and Error 30 €=>96 l 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k96l k. Depositions, affidavits, or dis-
covery. Most Cited Cases 
In applying the abuse of discretion standard to 
the district court's imposition of a particular sanc-
tion for a discovery violation, the Supreme Court 
gives the district court a great deal of latitude in de-
termining the most fair and efficient manner to con-
duct court business, because the district court judge 
is in the best position to evaluate the status of his or 
her cases, as well as the attitudes, motives, and 
credibility of the parties. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37. 
[26) Appeal and Error 30 €=>961 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k961 k. Depositions, affidavits, or dis-
covery. Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court will determine that a dis-
trict court has abused its discretion in choosing 
which discovery sanction to impose only if there is 
either an erroneous conclusion of law or no eviden-
tiary basis for the district court's ruling. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 37. 
*936 James S. Jardine, Matthew R. Lewis, Erin 
Bergeson Hull, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff Andrew 
G. Deiss, Billie J. Siddoway, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant Mark H. Robbins. 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
httD://web2.westlaw.com/Drint/Drintstream.asDx?mt=Westlaw&orft=HTMLE<fcvr=2.0&des . 8 /26/20 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page7ofl6 
215 P.3d 933,636 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2009 UT 52 
(Cite as: 215 P.3d 933) 
John A. Beckstead, H. Douglas Owens, Romaine C. 
Marshall, Salt Lake City, for defendant JPMorgan 
Chase Bank. 
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
U 1 In this case, we must determine the scope 
of a settlement agreement between Michael Bodell 
and his company Bodell Construction Company 
(collectively, "Bodell"), on the one hand, and Marc 
Jenson and his company MSF Properties 
(collectively, "Jenson"), on the other. More spe-
cifically, we must determine whether Bodell and 
Jenson intended their settlement agreement to settle 
only the claims between themselves or whether 
they intended the settlement agreement to also 
settle related claims involving third parties, spe-
cifically Bank One and Mark Robbins. 
H 2 Bank One and Robbins argued before the 
district court that the settlement agreement between 
Bodell and Jenson was an "accord and satisfac-
tion," meaning that the agreement was not limited 
to the claims between Bodell and Jenson but satis-
fied all related claims even those with third parties. 
On this basis, Bank One and Robbins moved for 
summary judgment regarding claims that Bodell as-
serted against them. In response, Bodell argued that 
the agreement was not an accord and satisfaction 
but rather a "release," meaning thai the agreement 
only released the named parties from the claims 
that they had against one another. The district court 
granted the summary judgment motion filed by 
Bank One and Robbins. 
f 3 On appeal, Bodell asserts that the district 
court erred when it (1) granted summary judgment 
on the ground that the settlement agreement was 
unambiguously an accord and satisfaction and (2) 
struck the report of Bodell's damages expert. 
H 4 Because we determine that the language of 
the settlement agreement unambiguously demon-
strates that Bodell and Jenson intended the agree-
ment to release only the claims they had against one 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
Page 6 
another, not any third-party claims, we reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment. But we 
affirm the district court's decision to strike the re-
port of Bodell's damages expert because we con-
clude that striking the report was within the district 
court's discretion. 
BACKGROUND 
K 5 For purposes of the summary judgment mo-
tion, the parties did not dispute the following ma-
terial facts. In January 2000, Robbins sold a 50 per-
cent interest in his bicycle companies (collectively, 
"Vtrax") to Cherokee & Walker ("C & W"). Within 
weeks of this transaction, Robbins and C & W be-
came dissatisfied with the business relationship. In 
May 2000, the parties agreed that Robbins would 
repurchase C & W's interest in Vtrax for $8 million. 
But Robbins *937 did not have $8 million. Con-
sequently, Robbins missed several payment dead-
lines over the next few months. The directors of C 
& W grew impatient and threatened to seize control 
of Vtrax. 
U 6 Robbins did not want to lose control of 
Vtrax, so he continued his search for a lender. Dur-
ing this search, Robbins became aware of the op-
portunity to acquire the popular "Mongoose" bi-
cycle brand. Robbins knew he needed complete 
control over Vtrax in order to pursue the Mongoose 
acquisition. At this point, Robbins approached Jen-
son, the owner of a hard-money lending business, 
and asked Jenson for $8 million. Robbins explained 
that Vtrax was pursuing the acquisition of Mon-
goose but that in order for the acquisition to be fi-
nalized Robbins needed $8 million to buyout C & 
W's interest in Vtrax. After several negotiations, 
Jenson agreed to loan Robbins the $8 million ne-
cessary for the C & W buyout. 
H 7 Jenson told Robbins that $4 million of the 
$8 million loan would come from Jenson's own 
money and Jenson would borrow the other $4 mil-
lion from someone else. Accordingly, Jenson ap-
proached Bodell about the possibility of borrowing 
$4 million. Jenson informed Bodell that the $4 mil-
lion Bodell contributed would be loaned to Robbins 
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for the C & W buyout. Jenson also informed Bodell 
that Robbins was pursing the acquisition of Mon-
goose. Jenson had known Bodell for many years, 
and Bodell had recently loaned Jenson $1 million in 
a separate transaction. Yet Bodell was hesitant 
about lending such a large sum of money to Jenson 
without knowing the stability of Vtrax. 
f 8 Jenson relayed Bodell's concerns to Rob-
bins. Subsequently, Robbins approached Benjamin 
Lightner, Robbins's private banker at Bank One, 
and asked Lightner to draft a letter representing the 
stability of Vtrax. On August 22, 2000, Lightner 
wrote a letter (the "Lightner Letter") addressed to 
"Whom It May Concern.** The Lightner Letter in-
dicated that Robbins and Jenson would be deposit-
ing $165 million into a Bank One account for 
MadTrax, the company created by Robbins to pur-
sue the acquisition of Mongoose. The deposit was 
to come from a loan agreement between MadTrax 
and Arimex Investments. In actuality, there was no 
loan agreement between MadTrax and Arimex. 
Still, Robbins gave a copy of the Lightner Letter to 
Jenson, who in turn gave a copy to Bodell, 
H 9 Eight days after the Lightner Letter was 
written, Bodell loaned $4 million to Jenson. As 
planned, Jenson then took the $4 million from the 
Bodell loan and $4 million of his own money and 
loaned $8 million to Robbins to buy out C & W. 
Robbins paid C & W the required $8 million and 
obtained full control of Vtrax. Two months later, 
Robbins's efforts to acquire Mongoose failed and 
Vtrax collapsed. Robbins defaulted on his loan pay-
ment to Jenson, and, subsequently, Jenson defaulted 
on his repayment obligation to Bodell. 
H 10 On March 18, 2003, Bodell and Jenson 
entered into a settlement agreement whereby Bodell 
released Jenson from all tort and contract claims in 
exchange for $3 million. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 
settlement agreement state as follows: 
1. Contemporaneous with the execution and de-
livery of this Agreement, [Jenson] has caused 
$3,000,000 in immediately available funds to be 
delivered to [Bodell], [Bodell] hereby acknow-
ledges receipt of such funds. 
2. Each of Bodell and BCC, for himself, itself, 
their affiliates and for all persons or entities 
claiming by, through or under him, it or them, 
hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever 
discharges MSF, its affiliates and their respective 
members, managers, officers, employees and 
agents (each, including without limitation Jen-
son, an "MSF Party") from any and all claims, 
allegations of fraud, charges, demands, losses, 
damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, 
causes of action, or suits at law and equity of 
whatsoever kind and nature, expenses, costs and 
attorneys fees, whether known or unknown, sus-
pected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated 
(each, a "Claim"), arising out of all past affili-
ations and transactions among Bodell, BCC and 
any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the 
Loans and all related arrangements and transac-
tions, (b) without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, *938 acknowledges and agrees that the 
obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with 
the Loans, including all principal and interest 
that may have been deemed to have accrued 
thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and re-
paid in full (Emphasis added.) 
K 11 Four months after executing the settlement 
agreement, Bodell filed suit against Bank One and 
Robbins claiming four causes of action: (I) fraud, 
(2) civil conspiracy, (3) negligent misrepresenta-
tions, and (4) unjust enrichment. 
H 12 On October 29, 2003, Bank One and Rob-
bins filed a motion for summary judgment. On 
March 15, 2004, Judge Bohling of the district court 
entered an order denying the motion for summary 
judgment filed by Bank One and Robbins. The dis-
trict court held that (I) the settlement agreement 
was not an accord and satisfaction, and (2) an ac-
cord and satisfaction does not operate for the bene-
fit of third parties unless the third parties are spe-
cifically referenced in the agreement. 
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<| 13 During the discovery period, the case was 
reassigned to Judge Kennedy. Three weeks after the 
close of discovery, Bodell served the expert report 
of Merrill Weight (the "Weight Report") on Bank 
One and Robbins. The Weight Report included 
three new damages theories that were not disclosed 
during discovery. Bank One and Robbins filed a 
motion to strike the Weight Report, The district 
court granted the motion because Bodell had (1) not 
disclosed its alternative damages theories during 
fact discovery, (2) failed to show good cause for its 
failure to timely disclose, and (3) prejudiced the de-
fendants by failing to disclose these theories. 
H 14 Additionally, Bank One and Robbins re-
newed their initial motion for summary judgment 
and asked Judge Kennedy to revisit the question of 
whether the settlement agreement was an accord 
and satisfaction. At a hearing on September 10, 
2007, Judge Kennedy granted summary judgment 
for Bank One and Robbins, ruling that (1) the set-
tlement agreement was unambiguously an accord 
and satisfaction, and (2) an accord and satisfaction 
operates for the benefit of third parties. Thus, the 
district court held that the settlement agree-
ment—as an accord and satisfaction—extinguished 
Bodell's claims of fraud and negligent misrepres-
entation asserted against Bank One and the claims 
of fraud, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment 
asserted against Robbins. 
T! 15 Bodell timely appealed. We have jurisdic-
tion to consider Bodell's arguments on appeal pur-
suant to Utah Code section 78A-3-l02(3)(j) (2008). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3][4] K 16 We review a district court's 
interpretation of a contract for correctness, giving 
no deference to the district court.FNI Whether a 
contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which 
we also review for correctness.FN2 We review a 
district court's decision to grant summary judgment 
for correctness, granting no deference to the district 
court's conclusions, and we view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
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the nonmoving party.FNJ We review discovery 
sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard.m 
FN1. Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 
1220 (Utah 1995). 
FN2. Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 
43,H 14,48P.3d918. 
FN3. Arnold Indus., Inc. v. Love, 2002 UT 
133, H 11,63 P.3d 721. 
FN4. Morton v. Cont'l Baking Co., 938 
P.2d 271,274 (Utah 1997). 
ANALYSIS 
K 17 We first consider Bodell's argument that 
the settlement agreement is a release rather than an 
accord and satisfaction. We conclude that the plain 
language of the settlement agreement unambigu-
ously demonstrates that the patties to the agreement 
intended that the agreement operate only as a mutu-
al release of claims rather than an accord and satis-
faction of all claims, including those against third 
parties. Next, we consider Bodell's argument that 
the district court abused its discretion in striking the 
report of Bodell's damages expert. Because we de-
termine*939 that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion, we affirm the district court's decision to 
strike the expert report. 
I. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT UNAM-
BIGUOUSLY RELEASES ONLY THE CLAIMS 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES NAMED IN THE 
AGREEMENT 
[5] % 18 Bodell argues that the district court 
erred in ruling that the settlement agreement unam-
biguously settled Bodell's claims against nonparties 
to the agreement. More specifically, Bodell argues 
that the settlement agreement plainly released only 
those claims that Bodell and Jenson had against one 
another. In the alternative, Bodell argues that the 
settlement agreement was ambiguous and extrinsic 
evidence demonstrates that the parties intended to 
limit the settlement agreement to claims between 
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Bodell and Jenson. We agree with Bodell's first ar-
gument, that the settlement agreement unambigu-
ously released only those claims between Bodell 
and Jenson. Accordingly, we decline to consider 
any extrinsic evidence. 
[6][7][8][9][10] U 19 "Settlement agreements 
are governed by the rules applied to general con-
tract actions." ™* When we interpret a contract, or 
in this case a settlement agreement, we determine 
"the intent of the contracting parties" by "first 
look[ing] to the writing alone." FN6 If the writing 
is unambiguous, we determine the intent of the 
parties exclusively from the " *plain meaning of the 
contractual language.' " " " Only where there is 
ambiguity in the terms of the contract may we as-
certain the parties' intent from extrinsic evidence. 
FN8 « «A contractual term or provision is ambigu-
ous if it is capable of more than one reasonable in-
terpretation because of uncertain meanings of 
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.' " 
FN9 
FN5. R & R Indus. Park, LLC v. Utah 
Prop. & Cos. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2008 UT 
80, \ 20, 199 P.3d 917 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
FN6. Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 
2009 UT 2,144, 201 P.3d966. 
FN7. Id (quoting Green River Canal Co. 
v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, J 17, 84 P.3d 1134). 
FN8. Id; see also Deep Creek Ranch, LLC 
v. Utah State Armory Bd.t 2008 UT 3, H 16, 
178P.3d886. 
FN9. Giusti, 2009 UT 2, U 44, 201 P.3d 
966 (quoting Dames v. Vincent, 2008 UT 
51,1(25,190P.3d 1269). 
% 20 The settlement agreement between Bodell 
and Jenson is unambiguous because it is capable of 
only one reasonable interpretation. The language of 
the settlement agreement unambiguously demon-
strates that Bodell and Jenson intended only to 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
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settle those claims that they had against one anoth-
er. First, the agreement identifies the parties to the 
agreement: 
THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (this 
"Agreement") is entered into ... by and among 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation ("BCC"), MICHAEL BODELL, 
an individual ("Bodell"), MARC S. JENSON, an 
individual ("Jenson"), and MSF PROPERTIES, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("MSF"). 
As we use the terms in this opinion, Bodell and 
Jenson are the only parties named by the settlement 
agreement.™10 Then the settlement agreement 
plainly limits its terms to those named parties. It 
states, 
FN 10. We have defined "Bodell" to in-
clude both Michael Bodell and Bodell 
Construction Company. We have defined 
"Jenson" to include both Marc Jenson and 
MSF Properties. 
WHEREAS, the parties now desire to achieve a 
full settlement of all obligations, disputes and 
other matters outstanding between them .... 
4.... MSF, Jenson, Bodell and BCC have defin-
itely settled all matters between them .... 
5. Each of the parties hereto understand and agree 
that this is a mutual release of claims and that fol-
lowing execution of this document, no Bodell 
Party shall have any claim against an MSF Party 
and no MSF Party shall have any claim against a 
Bodell Party.... (Emphases added.) 
\ 21 In addition to limiting its terms to the 
named parties, the settlement agreement *940 also 
specifically names which parties are released from 
which claims. The agreement states, 
2. Each of Bodell and BCC, for himself, itself, 
their affiliates and for all persons or entities 
claiming by, through or under him, it or them, 
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hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever 
discharges MSF, its affiliates and (heir respective 
members, managers, officers, employees and 
agents (each, including without limitation Jen-
son, an "MSF Party") from any and all claims, ... 
arising out of all past affiliations and transactions 
among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party, ... ac-
knowledges and agrees that the obligations of the 
MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, in-
cluding all principal and interest that may have 
been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby 
deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full .... 
(Emphases added.) 
There is no language to indicate that the parties 
intended to satisfy all of BodelPs potential tort and 
contract claims against persons not a party to the 
agreement. 
H 22 Bank One and Robbins argue that because 
the settlement agreement includes the word 
"satisfied," we should construe the agreement to be 
an accord and satisfaction, or, in other words, to 
satisfy any and all related claims that the named 
parties may have against nonparties to the agree-
ment. We disagree. 
[U][12][13][14][15] J 23 Accord and satisfac-
tion is a common law concept.™11 It denotes the 
intention of the contracting parties to "agree that a 
different performance, to be made in substitution of 
the performance originally agreed upon, will dis-
charge the obligation created under the original 
agreement." ftin An accord and satisfaction may 
discharge an obligation arising out of a "contract, 
quasi-contract, [or] tort." ™li When a claim is 
discharged through an accord and satisfaction, the 
claim is considered fully satisfied. The claimant no 
longer has the legal right to seek recovery from 
anyone on that claim.™14 Before we determine 
that an agreement constitutes an accord and satis-
faction, we must find the following three elements 
in the contract: "(1) an unliquidated claim or a bona 
fide dispute over the amount due; (2) a payment 
offered as full settlement of the entire dispute; and 
(3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
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of the dispute." ™* 
FN11. See IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon, 
776 P.2d 607, 614 n. 32 (Utah 1989). 
FN 12. ProMax Dew Corp. v. Raile, 2000 
UT 4, \ 20, 998 P.2d 254 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
FN 13. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Con-
str. Co.t 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1985). 
FN 14. See Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts § 1276 (1962) ( "Discharge by 
accord and satisfaction means a discharge 
by the rendering of some performance dif-
ferent from that which was claimed as due 
and the acceptance of such substituted per-
formance by the claimant as full satisfac-
tion of his claim." (emphasis added)). 
FN 15. ProMax, 2000 UT 4, % 20, 998 P.2d 
254. 
U 24 From a plain reading of the settlement 
agreement, we determine that the last two elements 
of an accord and satisfaction are not met. Although 
the agreement incorporated the offer of a payment 
by Jenson and the acceptance by Bodell in satisfac-
tion of an obligation, the language of the agreement 
does not indicate that the payment was offered and 
accepted with the intent to satisfy the entire under-
lying dispute. Rather, the payment was offered and 
accepted as "a frill settlement of all obligations, dis-
putes and other matters outstanding between them, 
including, but not limited to the Loans." (Emphasis 
added.) Thus, the plain language limits the effect of 
the payment to the settlement of the claims between 
Bodell and Jenson; claims as to third parties are not 
contemplated. 
K 25 Robbins and Bank One contend that by in-
cluding the term "satisfied" in the settlement agree-
ment, Bodell necessarily released any claims he 
may have against Bank One and Robbins, even 
though Bank One and Robbins were not parties to 
the agreement. We disagree. The parties' use of 
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"satisfied" in the settlement agreement does not al-
ter our reading of the agreement. Indeed, we de-
cline to adopt a rule that overlooks the contracting 
parties' clear intent and imputes a different meaning 
to a contract simply because the parties incorpor-
ated an otherwise *941 ordinary term into their 
agreement. "Satisfied" appears only once in the 
agreement and is limited by surrounding language. 
The agreement states that Bodell "acknowledges 
and agrees that the obligations of [Jenson] in con-
nection with the Loans ... are hereby deemed fully 
satisfied and repaid in full." Thus the word 
"satisfied" does not depict a full satisfaction of all 
underlying claims, as is characteristic of an accord 
and satisfaction; rather its impact is limited to "the 
obligations of [Jenson] in connection with the 
Loans." Thus, the settlement agreement satisfied 
only Jenson's loan obligation to Bodell. It did not 
satisfy any claims that Bodell may potentially have 
against Robbins or Bank One for full satisfaction of 
the debt owed.™'6 
FN 16. Because we determine that the plain 
language of the settlement agreement 
demonstrates that the parties intended to 
limit the impact of their agreement to the 
claims between them, we do not reach 
Bodell's argument that the Liability Re-
form Act, found in Utah Code section 
78B-5-822, prohibits this court from ap-
plying the agreement to claims Bodell may 
have against third parties. 
[16][17] % 26 Because we determine that the 
plain language of the settlement agreement limited 
the agreement to claims between Bodell and Jen-
son, we reverse the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment.™17 We now turn to the court's 
decision to strike the report of Bodell's damages ex-
pert. 
FN 17. Bank One argues that we should af-
firm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment on any of seven other theories 
that they presented to, but were not 
reached by, the district court. To serve ju-
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
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dicial economy, we may affirm a district 
court's decision whenever the decision ap-
pealed from "is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record." 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, H 13, 52 
P.3d 1158 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Bill Nav & Sons Exempting 
v. Neeley Corntr. Co.,'677 P.2d 1120, 1123 
(Utah 1984); Limb v. Federated Milk Pro-
ducers Ass% 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d 
290,293 n. 2 (1969). 
We decline to consider the alternative 
grounds in this case because we do not 
see that doing so will serve judicial eco-
nomy. The district court is already famil-
iar with the alternative theories as they 
have been fully briefed and argued to 
that court. Accordingly, we determine 
that the district court is in a better posi-
tion than we are at this time to rule on 
Bank One's alternative theories. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION FN STRIKING THE WEIGHT 
REPORT 
\ 27 Three weeks after the close of discovery, 
Bodell served the Weight Report on Bank One and 
Robbins. The Weight Report included three new 
damages theories that were not disclosed during 
discovery. Bank One and Robbins filed a motion to 
strike the Weight Report. The district court granted 
the motion because Bodell had (I) not disclosed his 
alternative damages theories during fact discovery, 
(2) failed to show good cause for his failure to 
timely disclose, and (3) prejudiced the defendants 
by failing to disclose these theories. 
U 28 Bodell argues that the district court abused 
its discretion in striking the Weight Report because 
Bodell's disclosure of the Weight Report did not vi-
olate any court order and complied with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In the alternative, Bodell 
argues that even if the Weight Report was not prop-
erly disclosed, the court nevertheless abused its dis-
cretion in striking the report because there was 
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good cause for the failure and the failure was harm-
less. Bank One and Robbins contest the merits of 
Bodell's arguments, and Bank One contends that 
this issue 5s not ripe for appeal. We first address 
Bank One's ripeness argument, and then we turn to 
the substance of Bodell's arguments. 
A. The Issue of Whether the District Court Erred in 
Striking the Weight Report Is Ripe for Appeal 
[18][19][20] K 29 A dispute is ripe "when 'a 
conflict over the application of a legal provision 
[has] sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of 
legal rights and obligations between the parties 
thereto.* " ™18 An issue is not ripe for appeal if " 
'there exists no more than a difference of opinion 
regarding the hypothetical application of [a provi-
sion] to a situation in which the parties might, at 
some *942 future time, find themselves.' " FNl9 If, 
however, an issue was "raised, argued, and resolved 
by the trial court prior to the entry o f a final judg-
ment, then that issue is ripe for appeal, and the 
"failure to raise [it] on appeal result[s] in a waiver 
of the[ ] right to raise [it] at a later time." ™10 
FN 18. Bd. ofTrs. of Wash. County Water 
Conservancy Dist. v. Keystone Conver-
sions, LLC, 2004 UT 84, \ 32, 103 P.3d 
686 (alteration in original) (quoting Red-
wood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 
624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981)). 
FN 19. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Redwood Gym, 624 P.2d at 1148). 
FN20. DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 935 P.2d 
499, 502 (Utah 1997) (citing State ex rel 
Road Comm'n v. Rohanf 28 Utah 2d 375, 
503 P.2d 141 (1972)); see also Smith v. 
DeNiro, 28 Utah 2d 259, 501 P.2d 265 
(1972). 
[21] \ 30 Bank One argues that the issue of 
whether the district court erred in its decision to 
strike the Weight Report is not ripe for appeal be-
cause there may be some future scenario in which 
an appellate court would not have to reach the is-
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
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sue. That future scenario would occur if the district 
court, on remand, were to enter summary judgment 
on one of Bank One's alternative theories, the case 
settled, or the case eventually reaches a jury and the 
jury finds against Bodell. To support its position, 
Bank One relies upon Rett v. Autoliv ASP, Inc. 
™
21
 and State v. Ortiz.™22 
FN21. 2005 UT2, 106 P.3d 705. 
FN22. 1999 UT 84,987 P.2d 39. 
II 31 In Pelt, we granted an interlocutory appeal 
challenging a district court's decision to grant a 
party leave to amend an answer to plead a particular 
affirmative defense.™23 The respondent asked us 
to determine whether Utah law recognized the af-
firmative defense that the petitioner sought to 
plead.™24 We declined to determine the scope of 
Utah law as it related to the affirmative defense be-
cause we determined that the issue had not 
"matured to the extent that we [could] know with 
certainty the facts and law which [would] shape its 
final outcome."FN25 
FN23. 2005 UT 2, \ 3, 106 P.3d 705. 
FN24. Id. 
FN25. Id. \ 5. 
\ 32 In Ortiz, two defendants challenged the 
sentencing structure applicable to the crimes with 
which they were charged.™26 Because the defend-
ants had not yet been convicted, we determined that 
the challenge was not ripe. We stated, "there are 
several possible circumstances under which we 
would not need to address the constitutionality of 
[the sentencing structure]." FN27 
FN26. 1999 UT 84, H 1,987 P.2d 39. 
FN27. Id % 4. 
^ 33 In both Rett and Ortiz, the challenged law 
had not yet been applied to the parties, and we de-
termined that without such application the chal-
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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lenges were not ripe. This case is markedly differ-
ent. Bodell has sought to submit the Weight Report, 
and the district court, applying Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(f) to the facts, struck the report. 
Though it is possible that the case could be later de-
cided or settled on issues unrelated to the informa-
tion in the Weight Report, the admissibility of the 
Weight Report is still properly before us. The issue 
has been squarely presented to the district court, the 
court has ruled on the. issue, the issue was ripe 
when the court ruled on it, and the court has issued 
a final judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
issue is ripe for our determination. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
in Striking the Weight Report 
[22] H 34 Bodell argues that the district court 
erred in striking the Weight Report because the dis-
closure of the report complied with the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and even if the disclosure had 
violated the rules, allowance of the report would 
not have harmed the defendants. Further, Bodell 
claims that he had good cause for his failure to pre-
viously disclose the information in the report. Bank 
One and Robbins argue that because Bodell did not 
disclose the damages theories in the Weight Report 
during initial disclosures or discovery, the district 
court was within its discretion to strike the Weight 
Report rather than reopen discovery. We determine 
that (1) Bodell violated Utah Rule of Civil Proced-
ure 26 when he failed to disclose the theories in the 
Weight Report before*943 the close of fact discov-
ery and (2) it was within the district courts discre-
tion to find that Bodell's failure to disclose harmed 
Bank One and Robbins and that Bodell did not have 
good cause for its failure to disclose the theories in 
a timely manner. 
[23][24][25][26] U 35 Rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a party dis-
close the "computation of any category of damages 
claimed by the disclosing party" during initial dis-
closures.™28 When a party fails to make timely 
disclosure, the district court is required to impose 
discovery sanctions on that party unless the "failure 
©2011 Thomson Reuters. 
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to disclose is harmless or the party shows good 
cause for the failure to disclose." FN29 The district 
court has "broad discretion regarding the imposi-
tion of discovery sanctions." FN3° In applying the 
abuse of discretion standard to the district court's 
imposition of a particular sanction, we give the dis-
trict court "a great deal of latitude in determining 
the most fair and efficient manner to conduct court 
business" because the district court judge "is in the 
best position to evaluate the status of his [or her] 
cases, as well as the attitudes, motives, and credib-
ility of the parties." FN3] Thus, we will determine 
that a district court "has abused its discretion in 
choosing which sanction to impose only if there is 
either an erroneous conclusion of law or no eviden-
tiary basis for the [district] court's ruling."hN32 
FN28. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C). 
FN29, Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f). 
Rule 37(0 allows for either the exclusion 
of the untimely disclosure or any other 
sanctions "authorized by Subdivision 
(b)(2)." Other available sanctions in-
clude "ordering] the [non-compliant] 
party or the attorney to pay the reason-
able expenses, including attorney fees, 
caused by the failure." Utah R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2)(D). 
FN30. Morton v. Cont'l Baking Co.. 938 
P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
FN31.Mat275. 
FN32. Id. at 274 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
K 36 We determine that in this case there was a 
sufficient evidentiary basis for the district court to 
exclude the Weight Report. The damages theories 
advanced in the Weight Report were not disclosed 
during the requisite discovery period. During initial 
disclosures, Bodell disclosed that its damages 
"constitute the funds advanced, together with in-
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
htttv//wp.lV? w^ctlnw pnmMrint /nrmtctrpam aonv?mtz=WAct1aw;&Twft:=*TTN/fT T2J?rxr*=r> f\firA*c C / I A n n i 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pagel5ofl6 
215 P.3d 933,636 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2009 UT 52 
(Cite as: 215 P.3d 933) 
Page 14 
terest at the legal rate, less the payment received 
from MSF." In response to a request for admission 
from Bank One, Bodell clarified that he sought in-
terest at the legal rate as provided in Utah Code 
sections 15-1-1 and 15-1-4, which provide that in-
terest shall accrue at "10% per annum" unless the 
parties "specify a different rate of interest." FN33 
Neither Bodell and Bank One nor Bodell and Rob-
bins had specified a different interest rate.FN34 
Thus, the district court was correct when it con-
cluded that Bodell disclosed only the following 
damages: "$4 million, less payments received, plus 
interest at the statutory rate." 
FN33. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (2005). 
FN34. Bodell contends that his discovery 
responses referred to the contractual in-
terest rate in the Promissory Note between 
Bodell and MSF. However, Bank One and 
Robbins were not parties to that note and, 
therefore, are not bound by it. See Ta)>lor, 
Cotton & Ridley, fna v. Okatie Hotel 
Group, LLC, 372 S.C. 89, 641 S.E.2d 
459, 464 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that 
the home owner was bound only to the 
statutory interest rate where the owner was 
not party to the contract wherein the gener-
al contractor and the subcontractor agreed 
to a higher interest rate); see also Casaccio 
v. Habel, 14 Ill.App.3d 822, 303 RE.2d 
548, 551 (Ill.App.Ct.1973) (determining 
that a nonparty to an agreement is not sub-
ject to the high interest rates of that agree-
ment). 
U 37 It was not until three weeks after fact dis-
covery closed that Bodell served the Weight Report 
on Bank One and Robbins. The Weight Report in-
cluded three new damages theories, including the 
Benefit of the Bargain Rule, the Modified Benefit 
of the Bargain Rule, and the Comparable Rate of 
Return theory. Bank One and Robbins moved to 
strike the Weight Report because they did not have 
the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding 
facts essential to these theories. According to Bank 
One and Robbins, essential facts included Bodell's 
loan history; the loan histories and practices of 
those to whom Bodell could have and would have 
allegedly loaned money in lieu of MSF; the capab-
ilities of MSF and Jenson to repay *944 or obtain 
financing to repay the $4 million loan at the time 
the loan was made; and Bodell's expenses, invest-
ments, and credit history at the time the loan was 
made. The district court agreed: "the defendants 
will suffer prejudice if Bodell were allowed to 
present these damages theories at trial because 
these claims and the bases for them were not dis-
closed during fact discovery and defendants are 
now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those 
theories." Though the district court could have re-
opened fact discovery to allow for these theories, 
the court was not obligated to do so. Thus, the 
court's finding of prejudice to Bank One and Rob-
bins was correct. 
T| 38 Bodell contends that he had good cause 
for his failure to comply with rule 26. Particularly 
Bodell argues that he "complied with generally ac-
cepted litigation practices" when he "disclosed its 
damages theories during fact discovery and then 
laid them out in greater detail in an expert report 
produced during the expert discovery period." We 
are unpersuaded. As we stated previously, Bodell's 
reference to Utah Code sections 15-1-1 and 
15-1-4 was insufficient to constitute disclosure of 
the "computation of any category of damages 
claimed by the disclosing party," particularly the 
Benefit of the Bargain Rule, the Modified Benefit 
of the Bargain Rule, and the Comparable Rate of 
Return theory. 
t 39 Because Bodeirs disclosure of the Weight 
Report failed to comply with rule 26, allowing the 
report would have prejudiced Bank One and Rob-
bins, and Bodell failed to show good cause for his 
failure, we affirm the district court's decision to ex-
clude the Weight Report. 
CONCLUSION 
K 40 The language of the settlement agreement 
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between Bodell and Jenson unambiguously demon-
strates that Bodell and Jenson intended the agree-
ment to release only the claims they had against one 
another, not any third-party claims they may have. 
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of 
summary judgment. But we affirm the district 
court's decision to strike the Weight Report. In light 
of the facts that Bodell failed to timely disclose the 
damages theories contained in the report, late dis-
closure of the theories would have prejudiced Bank 
One and Robbins, and Bodell failed to show good 
cause for his untimeliness, striking the report was 
within the discretion granted to the district court by 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(0-
H 41 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice PARR1SH, 
Justice NEHRING, and Judge WILLMORE concur 
in Associate Chief Justice DURRANTs opinion. 
|^ 42 Having disqualified himself, Justice WILKINS 
does not participate herein; District Judge 
THOMAS L. WILLMORE sat. 
Utah,2009. 
Bodell Const. Co. v. Robbins 
215 PJd 933,636 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2009 UT 52 
END OF DOCUMENT . 
Page 16 of 16 
Page 15 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
ocnv9mt=WAct10u/^nrft=HTMI F # v r = ? Cl&Ae* 8/26/201 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum 7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 2 of 5 
Westlaw, 
705 R2d 1167 
(Cite as: 705 P.2d U67) 
H 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Ronald L. BAXTER and Shirley Diane Baxter, hus-
band and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
and 
Rio Vista Oil Ltd., a Utah corporation, an Involun-
tary Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Robert Rees DANSIE and Marie Grow Dansie, his 
wife; Davis County Commissioners; Davis County 
Assessor; Davis County Recorder; and Weber 
County, a body politic of the State of Utah, Third-
Party Defendants. 
No. 19097. 
Aug. 26,1985. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 17, 1985. 
In quiet title action, the Second District Court, 
Weber County, Clavin Gould, J., granted summary 
judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that plaintiffs, 
adjacent landowners to plaintiff in prior action who 
had identical property rights, were not collaterally 
estopped from relitigating issue of validity of tax 
title to the property. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
111 Judgment 228 <0=>634 
228 Judgment 
228X1V Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in Gener-
al 
228k634 k. Nature and Requisites of 
Former Adjudication as Ground of Estoppel in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
To determine when, a party is collaterally es-
©2011 Thomson Reuters. 
Page 1 
topped from litigating an issue, it must be determ-
ined whether issue decided in prior adjudication 
was identical to one presented in the action in ques-
tion, whether there was a final judgment on the 
merits, whether party against whom plea is asserted 
was a party or in privity with a party to prior adju-
dication, and whether issue in first case was com-
pletely, fully, and fairly litigated. 
|2| Judgment 228 €=*675(3) 
228 Judgment 
228X1V Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
228XIV(B) Persons Concluded 
228k675 Persons Participating in or Pro-
moting Action or Defense 
228k675(3) k. Participation as Wit-
ness. Most Cited Cases 
Judgment 228 €==>707 
228 Judgment 
228X1V Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
228X1V(B) Persons Concluded 
228k706 Persons Not Parties or Privies 
228k707 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Judgment in prior action that tax title was void 
did not collaterally estop adjacent owner who held 
identical rights and who appeared as expert witness 
in the prior suit from relitigating the issue in sub-
sequent quiet title action; adjacent owner was not a 
party to the prior action, nor was in privity with 
plaintiff in that action. 
|3] Judgment 228 €==>678(2) 
228 Judgment 
228X1V Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
228XIV(B) Persons Concluded 
228k678 Privity in General 
228k678(2) k. What Constitutes Priv-
ity in General. Most Cited Cases 
For purposes of determining whether a person 
is collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue 
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decided in a prior action, sole fact that the person 
was a witness in the action does not, by itself, es-
tablish privity with any parties to that action; to es-
tablish privity, the witness also must have had some 
control over the litigation, and it is of no con-
sequence that witness afterward employs the same 
attorney, 
*U67 Glen E. Fuller, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs 
and appellants. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Stephen C. Ward, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, Brent D. Johns, 
Ogden, for defendant, third-party plaintiff and re-
spondent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
In this quiet title action, defendant Utah De-
partment of Transportation moved for and was 
granted summary judgment in the trial court on the 
basis that a judgment in a prior action collaterally 
estopped plaintiffs from bringing this action. 
Plaintiffs appeal, claiming that the prior action does 
not bind them since they were neither party nor 
privy to it. 
At a Davis County tax sale in 1969, plaintiff 
Ronald L. Baxter, together with Ronald Toone and 
Thomas Hollberg (owner of plaintiff Rio Vista Oil), 
purchased an 18-acre tract of land from defendant 
Davis County. The deed was issued to the three 
purchasers as tenants in common. In 1970, they 
split the 18 acres by quitclaiming to each other, so 
as to give each of them full ownership of a 6-acre 
parcel. The entire 18 acres lie north of the present 
course of the *1168 Weber River, which ostensibly 
marks the south boundary of Weber County and the 
north boundary of Davis County. 
In 1975, LeGrande Johnson Construction Com-
pany, a contractor doing work for the Utah Depart-
ment of Transportation, entered onto Toone's parcel 
(the westerly six acres) and began removing road 
building materials. Toone brought an action against 
Johnson to recover the value of the materials re-
moved. Johnson defended, claiming that Toone did 
not own the land because it was north of the river, 
putting it in Weber County; thus the Davis County 
tax title under which he claimed title was void. The 
parties stipulated that the location of the Weber 
River upon statehood (January 4, 1896) marked the 
boundary between Weber and Davis Counties. 
Toone argued that in 1896 the river was located 
1,000 feet north of its present location and that the 
land was then and is still in Davis County, making 
valid the tax title. A jury upheld Johnson's defense 
and denied Toone's claim for damages. 
Defendants contend that plaintiffs are collater-
ally estopped from bringing this action because the 
boundary between Davis and Weber Counties was 
established in the Toone action for all three of the 
grantees of the tax title. They urge that Baxter, in 
particular, is collaterally estopped because he was a 
witness at the trial of the Toone action, was fully 
acquainted with the character and objective of 
Toone's action, and was interested in the results of 
that action because a favorable ruling there would 
have validated the title to his land. They further 
urge that he afterward retained Toone's lawyer to 
bring this action, which was tried by the same judge 
who presided over Toone's jury trial. 
[1] In Searle Brothers v. Searle. Utah, 588 P.2d 
689 (1978), we adopted the test set forth in 
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust <£ 
Savings Association, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 
(1942), to determine when a party is collaterally es-
topped from litigating an issue: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in 
question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asser-
ted a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication? 
Searle Brothers also recognized an additional 
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element later added by the California Supreme 
Court in Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Insur-
ance Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 
P.2d 439 (1962), cert, denied, 372 U.S. 966, 83 
S.Ct. 1091,10 L.Ed.2d 130 (1963), namely: 
4. Was the issue in the first case completely, 
fully, and fairly litigated? 
If any of these four elements are not satisfied, 
then summary judgment based on the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel is not available. Wilde v. Mid-
Century Insurance Co.t Utah, 635 P.2d 417 (1981); 
see Robertson v. Campbell, Utah, 674 P.2d 1226 
(1983); Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 
P.2d 1044(1971). 
[2][3] Collateral estoppel cannot be invoked in 
this instance because Baxter was not a party to the 
Toone action, see Bank of Vernal v. Uintah County, 
122 Utah 410, 250 P.2d 581 (1952), and there was 
no privity between Baxter and Toone, see Nielson 
v. Droubay, Utah, 652 P.2d 1293 (1982); 
Ruffinengo v. Miller, Utah, 579 P.2d 342 (1978). 
Toone alone was the plaintiff in the prior action. 
Although Baxter owned the tract adjoining Toone's 
tract, no materials were taken from the Baxter prop-
erty by Johnson Construction Company. Even as-
suming that Baxter had the right to intervene in the 
Toone suit, we have held that where a party has a 
right to intervene but fails to do so, he is not bound 
by the judgment. Searle Brothers v. Searle, supra. 
Baxter's only direct connection with the Toone suit 
was that he appeared as an expert witness for 
Toone, furnishing surveying testimony. Defendant 
does not claim and there is nothing before us to 
suggest that Baxter had any control over the Toone 
litigation. It is widely held that the sole fact that a 
person is a witness in M169 an action does not, by 
itself, establish privity with any of the parties to 
that action. To establish privity, the witness also 
must have had some control over the litigation. 
Rynearson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 43 
Or.App. 943, 607 P.2d 738 (1979); Elliott v. 
Brown, Alaska, 569 P.2d 1323 (1977); see also Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments § 39 (nonparty 
who controls action is bound by judgment). It is of 
no consequence that the witness afterward employs 
the same attorney. Rynearson v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., supra; In re Estate of Richardson, 250 
Iowa 275, 93 N.W.2d 777 (1958). Some of the 
cases stress that in order to establish privity the wit-
ness in the prior action must have had the right to 
appeal. Crockett v. Harrison, 26 IlLApp.2d 9, 167 
N.E.2d 428 (1960); Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. 
v. Patrick, 131 Ind.App. 105, 166 N.E.2d 654 
(I960); see also Ruffinengo v. Miller, supra. That 
the witness had some interest in the outcome of the 
case is immaterial if he lacked control over the tri-
al. Parker v. Schmeltekopf Tex.Civ.App., 504 
S.W,2d 817 (1974). Nor is an adjoining landowner 
in privity with his neighbor simply because they 
may have identical rights. Ruffinengo v. Miller, 
supra. 
We recognize that a few jurisdictions hold that 
a party who does nothing more than appear as a 
witness is bound by the action, Desimone v. Spence, 
51 Wash.2d 412, 318 P.2d 959 (1957), especially 
where the witness could have intervened, but chose 
not to, Bacon v. Gardner, 38 Wash.2d 299, 229 
P.2d 523 (1951); Moreland v. Meade, 162 Md. 95, 
159 A. 101 (1932). We decline to follow those jur-
isdictions since we resolve all doubts in favor of 
permitting parties to have their day in court on the 
merits of a controversy. Ruffinengo v. Miller, 
supra. We do note, however, that in some of the 
cases cited by defendant in support of invoking col-
lateral estoppel, the witness had some additional in-
terest in the outcome of the litigation. For example, 
in Talbot v, Quaker-State Oil Refining Co., 104 
F,2d 967 (3d Cir.1939), the witness was, in addi-
tion, a joint owner of the patent sued upon by the 
plaintiff. In Terry & Wright of Keniuckv v. Crick, 
Ky., 418 S.W.2d 217 (1967), the general rule that 
solely appearing as a witness is insufficient was re-
cognized, but collateral estoppel was invoked there 
because the plaintiffs claim in the prior action actu-
ally included an item of damages sustained by the 
witness. 
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We need not address whether any of the other 
elements of collateral estoppel are present. 
The summary judgment is reversed, and the 
case is remanded to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
Utah,1985. 
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